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QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRESENTED BY SECTIONS
2, 3, 5 AND 10 OF THE PROPOSED UNIFORM
AVIATION LIABILITY ACT

A.

Constitutional Prohibitions Against Legislative Limitations
on Amounts Recoverable for Death, Injury or Property
Damage.
There are constitutional provisions in nine States which prohibit the enactment of statutes limiting the amount of damages
recoverable for death, injury or property damage. In four States
the prohibition is applicable only to death claims, in two States to
injury and death claims, and in three States to injury, death and
property damage claims.
The following tabulation shows the States involved, the constitutional provisions referred to, and whether the prohibition is
applicable to claims for injuries or death or property damage:
Character of
claims to which
Reference to Constiprohibition is
State
tutional Provision
directed
Arizona
Arkansas

Article II, Sec. 31
Article V, Sec. 32

Kentucky

Section 54

New York
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania

Article
Article
Article
Article

Utah
Wyoming

Article XVI, Sec. 5
Article X, Sec. 4

I, Sec. 18
I, Sec. 19 (a)
XXIII, Sec. 7
III, Sec. 21

Injury and death.
Injury, death and
property damage.
Injury, death and
property damage.
Death.
Death.
Death.
Injury, death and
property damage.
Death.
Injury and death.

* Criticisms and Suggestions Relating to the PROPOSED UNIFORM AVIATION
LIABILITY ACT, UNIFORM LAW OF AiRFLIGHT and UNIFORM Ain JURISDICTION ACT

Contained in TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 1 of the AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE.
Submitted September 3, 1937. Continued from the October, 1937, issue of
the JOURNAL OF AIR LAW.

The references in the report are directed to the pamphlet published by the
American Law Institute entitled "Law of Airflight, Tentative Draft No. 1,"
under date of April 7, 1937. For convenient reference, the three proposed Acts
have been printed as an appendix hereto.
t A Committee Appointed by Colonel Edgar S. Gorrell, President, Air Transport Association of America.
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The caption to alternate Section 3 (pp. 20 to 23, lines 1 to 98)
states that it is intended for use in States in which Section 3 would
be unconstitutional because of a prohibition against legislation limiting "the amount of recovery for death" and thus ignores the fact
that in Arizona, Arkansas, Kentucky, Pennsylvania and Wyoming,
Section 3 would be unconstitutional as to injury claims, as well as
death claims. Because of this difference in constitutional provisions, Sections 2 and 3 might be held to be wholly invalid in some
of the nine States and only partially invalid in others. The unconstitutionality of Section 2 on this ground cannot be avoided by provisions such as are contained in alternate Section 3 because of the
absence of any contractual relations between the owners of aircraft
and persons on the ground.
Alternate Section 3 is designed to solve the constitutional
obstacle to limited liability in the foregoing nine States. Kentucky
is one of those states and its legislature may not have power to
authorize limitation of the liability of common carriers by air pursuant to alternate Section 3, in view of Section 196 of the State
constitution:
"No common carrier shall be permitted to contract for relief from
its common law liability."
Alternate Section 3 probably will have the intended effect as to
injuries. or death occurring on trips wholly within any one of the
remaining eight States. Even this however is not free from doubt.
See Kentucky State Journal Co. v. Workmen's Compensation
Board, 161,Ky. 562, 170 S. W. 1166, holding that the Kentucky
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1914 violated the Kentucky constitutional prohibition against limitations on damages recoverable
for injuries, on the ground that the contract arising by implication
under the terms of the Act was not a free and voluntary contract.
Air transportation for compensation is principally interstate and
the application of alternate Section 3 to interstate trips will create
many difficulties of interpretation and probable conflict with the
federal constitution. Some of the questions which may arise in this
connection are hereafter considered at pages 142 to 144.
B.

Liability Without Fault Under the Due Process Clauses of
the Federal and State Constitutions.

The question of whether Sections 2, 3 and 5 would be invalid
under the due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions is one of difficulty and we cannot within the time at our dis-
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posal do more than suggest the principal contentions which will
probably be made for and against the validity of the Act.
Cases involving other instances of statutes imposing liability
without fault are far from conclusive upon our problem. The most
important decisions of this character seem to be those involving
workmen's compensation acts.
In New York Central Railroad Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188,
the Court upheld the New York Workmen's Compensation Act.
The statute was compulsory both on employers and employees. It
made the employer in certain hazardous employments absolutely
liable for injuries to employees occurring in the course of their employment and limited the maximum amount of recovery to specific
amounts.
In Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, the Court upheld the
Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act which was elective as to both
employer and employee. The defenses of contributory negligence,
assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule were withdrawn
from employers who rejected the Act. The Act also set up a
presumption that an employer who rejected it was negligent. If
an employee rejected the Act, there was no presumption and the
common law defenses held.
The Arizona Employers' Liability Act passed on in the Arizona
Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S.400, made the employer liable
without fault and for an unlimited amount of damage unless the
employee was negligent. The employee, but not the employer, had
a right to elect this form of liability or to sue under a Workmen's
Compensation Act which created absolute liability but limited the
amount of recovery. Employees had the further election of resorting to an action for negligence, with recovery u.nlimited, subject,
however, to defenses such as assumption of risk and contributory
negligence. An injured employee sued under the Employees Liability Act and it was held constitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment by a five to four decision.
In Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E.
431, the Court held that the first New York Workmen's Compensation Act violated the due process clause of the State constitution.
A constitutional amendment was subsequently passed permitting a
workmen's compensation statute. Although subsequent Supreme
Court cases brought'the Ives case into disrepute, the possibility of
the present statute being held a violation of State due process
clauses must be considered. We have not made any investigation
with reference to that subject.
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Decisions upholding the validity of workmen's compensation
acts are based largely on the relation existing between employer
and employee. This was emphasized in Crowell v. Benson, 285
U. S. 22, where the Supreme Court upheld the longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (44 Stat. 1424) providing in
substance that where employees in maritime employment are disabled or die from accidental injuries arising in the course of their
employment upon navigable waters of the United States, their employers shall pay reasonable compensation without regard to fault
and be relieved from further liability. In its opinion by Mr. Chief
justice Hughes the Court said at pages 55 to 56:
"Again, it cannot be maintained that the Congress has any general
authority to amend the maritime law so as to establish liability without
fault in maritime cases regardless of particular circumstances or relations. It is unnecessary to consider what circumstances or relations
might permit the imposition of such a liability by amendment of the
maritime law, but it is manifest that some suitable selection would be
required. In the present instance, the Congress has imposed liability
without fault only where the relation of master, and servant exists in
maritime employment and, while we hold that the Congress could do
this, the fact of that relation is the pivot of the statute and, in the
absence of any other justification, underlies the constitutionality of this
enactment. If the person injured was not an employee of the person
sought to be held, or if the injury did not occur upon the navigable
waters of the United States, there is no ground for an assertion that the
person against whom the proceeding was .directed could constitutionally
be subjected, in the absence of fault upon his part, to the liability which
the statute creates."

The Court thus held the Act valid because of the relationship
existing between employer and employee. There is clearly no
similar relation or any relation at all between owners of aircraft
and persons on the ground to sustain the validity of Section 2. As
to Section 3 there is a contractual relation between owners of aircraft and passengers, but it is a radically different kind of a relationship than that of employer and employee, and a court might
give little weight to such a relationship in passing on the validity
of Section 3.
It has been suggested (July 1, 1935, issue of Air Law Review,
pp. 207, 211) that the statement in the opinion in Crowell v. Benson, supra, that Congress had no authority to establish liability
without fault "regardless of particular circumstances or relations,"
implies that the constitutionality of statutes imposing liability without fault may be sustained on the basis of "particular circumstances," as well as the relation of employer and employee; and that
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the crash of an airplaine for an unknown reason is such a "particular
circumstance." This argument assumes that the causes of airplane
accidents cannot be ascertained and that a particular case in which
the validity of the proposed Act is tested will necessarily involve
an accident, the cause of which cannot be determined. The assumption is contrary to facts. An-examination of the Department
of Commerce reports relating to aircraft accidents will disclose
that the causes of airplane accidents are ascertainable (Air Commerce Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. pp. 189-90, Vol. 8, No. 11, pp. 234-235).
In our opinion the workmen's compensation decisions cannot be
regarded as precedents establishing the validity of the proposed
uniform act. Such decisions are based on the employer-employee
relationship and the courts in upholding compensation legislation
have been influenced largely by the social problem involved. In the
opinion in New York Central Railroad Company v. White, 243 U.
S. 188, Mr. Justice Pitney said that the statute was intended as a
just settlement of a difficult problem involving one of the most important of social relations. In another opinion by Mr. Justice
Pitney (Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 240)
he said that employees injured in industrial employment might command the attention of the State as justly as soldiers wounded in
battle. This thought does not seem especially apposite to aviation.
A State certainly does not have a comparable interest in what happens to non-resident passengers engaged in interstate travel on an
airplane which flies over the State.
In Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway Co. v. Zernecke,
183 U. S. 582, the court upheld a Nebraska statute creating absolute
liability against railroads for passenger injuries, except in cases
where passengers were grossly negligent. The opinion is based
largely upon the ground that because the Railroad was a corporation
created by the State adopting the statute, the State had power to
make the regulation in question.
'The same Nebraska statute was upheld by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Clark v. Russell, 97 Fed. 900. The court said
(italics ours) in its opinion:
"* * * it is quite clear that a common carrier of passengers, who
conducts its business by the powerful and dangerous agency of a rail-

road, the right to use which is derived from the legislature of the state,

may be required by the State to compensate its passengers for injuries it
inflicts upon them independent of any question of its own negligence."

T'he right to operate aircraft over a State on interstate trips is not
derived from the States but from Section 10 (49 U. S. C. A. 180)
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of the Air Commerce Act of 1926, which defines the term "navigable air space" and provides: "Such navigable air space shall be
subject to a public right of freedom of interstate and foreign air
navigation in conformity with the requirements of this sub-chapter."
The power of a State legislature to impose liability without
fault was also recognized in City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S.
313, where the Court upheld an Illinois statute imposing liability
against municipalities to landowners for damages caused by riot.
The ground of the Court's decision was that the State which creates
subordinate municipal governments and vests in them police powers
may impose upon them the duty of protecting property from mob
violence.
St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Company v. Matthews,
165 U. S. 1, will undoubtedly 'be relied upon to sustain Section 2.
The Court there upheld the validity of a Missouri statute which
made railroads operating in the State liable, irrespective of negligence, for property injured or destroyed by fire communicated by
locomotive engines. The ground upon which the Court upheld the
statute is stated in the following sentence at page 26 from the
opinion by Mr. Justice Gray:
"When both parties are equally faultless, the legislature may properly consider it to be just that the duty of insuring private property
against loss or injury caused by the use of dangerous instruments should
rest upon the railroad company, which employs the instruments and
creates the peril for its own profit, rather than upon the owner of the
property, who has no control over or interest in those instruments."

In our opinion the foregoing decision does not establish the
validity of Section 2. Only two parties were involved in the factual
situation which created the damage sought to be recovered, namely,
the railway Company whose engine discharged sparks and the
person whose property was burned as a result. Airplane accidents
may involve a third party who is at fault and is responsible for the
accident. The decision in the Matthew case certainly does not hold
that where a loss must fall on one of two parties who are not at
fault, or on a third party who is at fault, the legislature may ignore
the liability of the third party and place absolute liability, irrespective of negligence, on one of the other parties. Furthermore, flight
of aircraft is not comparable to the discharge of sparks by a locomotive. One is uncontrollable and frequently causes damage
whereas the other is controllable and seldom causes damage.
In Western & Atlantic Railroad v. Henderson, 279 U. S. 639,
the Court passed on a Georgia statute which provided that the mere
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fact of collision between a railway train and a vehicle at a grade
crossing established a presumption that the railway company was
negligent and that this presumption could be considered by a jury
as evidence against the testimony of witnesses tending affirmatively
to prove due care. In holding that the statute violated the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court said at
page 642:
"Legislation declaring that proof of one fact or group of facts shall
constitute prima facie evidence of an ultimate fact in issue is valid if
there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to
be inferred. * * *
The mere fact of collision between a railway train and a vehicle
at a highway grade crossing furnishes no basis for any negligence of
the railway company or of the traveler on the highway or of both or
without fault of anyone."

The Court then referred to Mobile, I. & K. C. R. R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, where the Court upheld a Mississippi statute
providing that injury inflicted by locomotives should be prima facie
evidence of want of reasonable care by the operator, and said at
page 643:
"That case is essentially different from this one. Each of the state
enactments raises a presumption from the fact of injury caused by the
running of locomotives or cars. The Mississippi statute created merely
a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the introduction of
opposing evidence. Gulf, M. & N. R. Co. v. Brown, 138 Miss. 39, 66,
et scq. Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v. Fondren, 145 Miss. 679. That of
Georgia as construed in this case creates an inference that is given
effect of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony and is to
prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate.
The presumption raised by Sec. 2780 is unreasonable and arbitrary
and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."

If a State has no power to create a presumption of negligence
against a railroad company on the basis of a grade crossing accident
and give that presumption the weight of evidence to be considered
by a jury with other evidence, it would seem to follow that a State
has no power to create liability, even in a limited amount, against
a,common carrier, regardless of negligence, on the mere basis of
the occurrence of an accident.
A further question presented by Sections 2, 3 and 5 and the
definition of "owner" in Section l(d), is whether or not absolute
liability may be fastened upon one merely because his consent is
necessary to the operation of an airplane. Whether the definition
of "owner" is too broad depends upon the extent to which the idea
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of operation with "consent" is extended beyond the ordinary limits
of agency.
The Supreme Court held it proper for New Jersey to determine
that a New Jersey owner is liable for injuries resulting to a pedestrian from the negligent driving of his automobile by another person in New York, where the owner had lent the car to the other
person for the purpose of driving it in New York and where a
New York statute made the owner of the car liable for negligent
operation when the operator was driving with the owner's permission (Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 47 Harv. Law Review 349,
61 A. L. R. 866, 878, 83 A. L. R. 878, 884). On the other hand,
in the case of a somewhat similar Ontario statute, it was held that
a New York passenger injured in Ontario by a driver's negligence
could not recover against the owner where the operator had used the
car with a New York owner's permission, but where it did not
appear whether there had been specific consent to operation in
Ontario (Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp., 68 Fed. (2d) 942, Second C. C. A.). The opinions in these two cases illustrate some of
the problems that may be expected to occur in dealing with the
"consent" idea, and these problems will be more acute, where as
here the liability goes beyond liability for negligent operation.
Section 3(a) contains the extraordinary provision that the
owner is liable for all injuries from any cause short of the passenger's wilful misconduct. Alternate Section 3(a) contains the equally
extraordinary provision that the owner is liable for all injuries
from any cause short of the passenger's wilful negligence. These
provisions carry the idea of liability without fault beyond anything
ever suggested, for if the provisions be taken literally, the ordinary
limitations of proximate cause are disregarded. Not only is assumption of risk or contributory negligence no defense, but apparently absence of proximate cause would not be a defense either.
The workmen's compensation cases and other authorities relating
to imposition of liability without fault lend no support to this cavalier treatment of causation.
Liability Without Fault Under the Commerce Clause and
Related Problems
The proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act imposes liability
as to interstate, as well as intrastate operations and thus raises the
question of whether the imposition of this liability constitutes an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The decisions previously referred to regarding liability without fault under the due
C.
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process clause do not raise the question of the validity of such
legislation under the commerce clause.
The courts have held that in the absence of Congressional
action (1) a State death act can apply to the death of a steamboat
passenger traveling in interstate commerce (Sherlock v. Ailing, 93
U. S. 99; Cf. The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398) ; and (2) a State workmen's compensation act can apply to an employee engaged in interstate commerce (Kulczyk v. Rockport Steamship Co., 8 Fed. Supp.
336; Cf. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Castle, 224 U. S. 541 and see

New York Central R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147); and (3)
a State statute forbidding a railroad to limit its liability by contract
can apply to persons or goods moving in interstate commerce (Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133).
The foregoing authorities do not in our opinion establish the
validity of the proposed Uniform Act as applied to interstate passengers or shippers and especially as to non-resident passengers
injured on an interstate trip of an airplane flying over a State and
as to non-resident shippers of air express in interstate commerce.
The common law doctrine that the law of the place of injury determines tort liability has had great influence in constitutional decisions
(Young v. Masci, 289 U. S. 253, 258), but that doctrine alone does
not decide every question of a State's power to deal with injuries
occurring within its borders. Residence and other factors may
have something to do with the matter (Bradford Electric Co. v.
Clapper, 286 U. S. 145). Moreover, the liability created by statutes
imposing liability without fault is not ordinary tort liability; the
courts have suggested that a different nomenclature would be more
appropriate (Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, supra, at page 154;
Val Blatz Brewing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 201 Wis. 474, 230
N. W. 622).
In the due process cases upholding workmen's compensation
acts, the reasoning of courts has proceeded upon ground strikingly
similar to that which is resorted to in cases of regulation of business.
The Supreme Court in speaking of workmen's compensation statutes has said:
"* * * the liability under workmen's compensation acts is not
for a tort. It is imposed as an incident of the employment relationship,
as a cost to be borne by the business enterprise, rather than as an
attempt to extend redress for the wrongful act of the employer."
(Alaska Packers' Association v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U.
S. 532, 541.)

If statutes of this type constitute regulations of the business
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enterprises involved, rather than mere alterations in tort liability,
it is necessary to find some local interest that will sustain a State's
effort to effect the consequences of an interstate operation. (Bradford Electric Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145.) In the case of an
interstate non-resident passenger on an airplane flown over a State
by a foreign corporation, this interest seems remote. See pages 146
to 149 for a discussion of differences in legislative power of states
with respect to interstate industries which use state highways as
compared to interstate air lines which use Federal airways.
Another commerce clause problem arises under the decision in
Wabash, St. Louis & PennsylvaniaRy. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557,
holding that a State cannot regulate interstate railway rates even as
to the part of a shipment within its borders, regardless of whether
Congress has acted. Section 3(b) and alternate Section 3(c) provide as to passengers carried for compensation that an owner may
establish a higher schedule of liability than the statute provides,
which may vary according to the rate of compensation paid. Section 5(b) provides that an owner may establish and collect rates
varying according to the value of baggage, personal effects or
goods, the minimum rate being based on a value of $100. Query,whether the relation of these sections to rates on interstate operations is so remote that they would not come within the rule of the
Wabash case.
A problem not dissimilar to the commerce problem will doubtless arise under both the due process clause and the full faith and
credit clause of the Federal Constitution in case the proposed
statute is passed in some States and not in others, or is differently
interpreted in different States.
Assume that a transcontinental shipment of air express originates in New Jersey, which has not passed the statute. Nebraska,
which is on the route, has passed it. The contract of shipment is
made in New Jersey. Can Nebraska say that the minimum rate
for the shipment shall be based on a value of $100.00? Can Nebraska regulate the New Jersey contract to the extent of permitting
the owner to refuse to carry the goods unless the shipper specifies
the actual value? This situation not only raises questions under
the commerce clause but also under the doctrine of Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, and subsequent cases dealing with the
power of a State to regulate extra-state contracts (see New York
Life Insurance Co. v. Head, 234 U. S. 149; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S.357).
Assume that a passenger is about to make a transcontinental
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trip. Nebraska, which is on the route, has passed the uniform
act. New Jersey, the State of departure, has passed a statute
bimilar to the one applied to railroads in Chicago, Milwaukee &
St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, forbidding contracts
limiting liability. Both passenger and owner wish to agree to a
maximum recovery of $25,000 for injury in Nebraska at an accordingly higher rate as permitted by the Nebraska statute. The con-tract is made in New Jersey. Can New Jersey forbid it or does the
passenger have to make a second contract after he leaves the State?
And even if the Nebraska statute may be applied in a suit in
Nebraska, despite the New Jersey statute, there remains for determination the question of whether the Nebraska statute would be
applicable if suit were brought in New Jersey (Alaska Packers'
Assn. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532).
Experience with State workmen's compensation laws indicates
that in the absence of absolute uniformity, both of statutory terms
and of interpretation, there is bound to be great confusion with
respect to situations such as the hypothetical cases suggested above.
Even if due process of law permits a State under all circumstances
to regulate liability, as proposed in the Uniform Act, it does not
follow that other States must give that law effect under all circumstances, even after judgment in the State where injury occurs
(see Stone, J., dissenting in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S.
202, 214-220; see also Alaska Packers' Association v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 294 U. S. 532, 546; Milwaukee County v.
White Co., 296 U. S. 268, 273-274).
The validity of contracts of common carriers limiting liability
for injuries incurred on interstate transportation is ordinarily determined by the law of the State where the contract is made and
where transportation starts, and not by the law of the State where
an injury occurs. In Conklin, Administratrix v. Canadian-Colonial
Airways, Inc., 226 N. Y. 244, 194 N. E. 692, the plaintiff's intestate
purchased a ticket at Albany for transportation to Newark. The
ticket contained a provision purporting to limit liability for injury
or death. The airplane crashed in New Jersey The Court of
Appeals of New York, in holding that the validity of the contract
of transportation was governed by the laws of New York, said:
"As a general rule the place of the wrong is in the state where the
last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes
place. American Law Institute, Proposed Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
Chap. 9. The accident occurred in New Jersey. The law of the State
of New York, however, governs this case. The validity of a stipulation
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in a contract for the transportation of persons or property from one
State to another limiting the carrier's common law liability is to be
determined by the law of the place where the contract was made and
the transportation commenced, without reference to the law of the place
of destination. Fish v. Delaware L. & W. R. R. Co., 211 N. Y. 374, 383."
Alternate Section 3 purports to change the general rule of
law applied in the Conklin case. Alternate Section 3(b) provides
that the owner of aircraft carrying passengers for compensation
shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted the absolute but
limited liability imposed by alternate Section 3 for injury to passengers "within this State," unless he notifies the passenger in
writing prior to flight, "whether flight commences within or outside
of this State," that he rejects such liability. A similar provision
applicable to passengers is found in alternate Section 3(f).
Assume that New York, which has a constitutional prohibition
against legislative limitations on damages recoverable for death,
adopts alternate Section 3; that under the laws of New Jersey a
contract made by a common carrier limiting liability for injury
or death is invalid; that a passenger purchases a ticket at Newark,
New Jersey, for transportation to Chicago; that neither passenger
nor owner gives the other written notice of rejection of statutory
liability under alternate Section 3 for death occurring in New York,
and that the passenger dies as a result of injuries sustained in
New York. Such a situation suggests numerous questions for,
judicial determination. If suit is brought in New Jersey to recover
damages for the death in New York, will the courts of New Jersey
enforce the implied contract limiting liability, even though such
contract is contrary to public policy and illegal in New Jersey?
If suit is brought in New York, will the courts of that State enforce the contract, even though it was illegal in the State in which
it was made? If suit is brought in a third State, will the courts
of that State apply the law of New Jersey or of New York? The
decisions heretofore cited dealing with the application of workmen's compensation acts in cases where an employment contract is
made in one State and an injury occurs in another, indicate the
difficulties and conflicting decisions which may be anticipated in
such cases under alternate Section 3.
Alternate Section 3 makes no provision for the contingency
that an owner or a passenger might refuse to sign a receipt for a
notice of rejection delivered to him by the other party pursuant to
alternate Sections 3(b) or 3(f). In such event would alternate
Section 3(g) or 3(h) be applicable?
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Alternate Section 3 purports to obviate a difficulty arising
under State constitutions by creating a contractual relation between
passenger and owner. Can such a contract be imposed on a passenger who is an infant because of his failure to give notice rejecting the statutory liability?
D.

Compulsory Insurance.

Our investigation has not disclosed any decision relating to
the validity of State compulsory insurance of aircraft. There are,
however, decisions dealing with the question of whether State statutes requiring owners of motor vehicles to carry insurance are
valid under the commerce clause, the due process clause and the
equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court has held that a State may
require compulsory insurance to be carried by operators of motor
vehicles insuring their liability against damage to property of and
injuries to third persons. In Hicklin v. Coney, 290 U. S. 169, the
defendants were contract carriers of property by motor truck in
interstate commerce. It did not appear whether or not the defendants were also engaged in intrastate commerce. The defendants
contended'that a statute of South Carolina requiring compulsory
insurance, as applied to them, violated the due process, the equal
protection and the commerce clauses of the Constitution. The South
Carolina courts had determined that the statute did not require
cargo insurance and the decision of the Supreme Court was therefore confined to a determination of the validity of compulsory
insurance for the benefit of third persons. The Court said at page
171:
"It was competent for the State in exercising its control over the
use of the highways to make reasonable regulations governing that use
by private contract carriers. These regulations may require on the part
of interstate as well as intrastate carriers the payment of reasonable
license fees and the filing of insurance policies to protect the interests
of the public by securing compensation for injuries to third persons and
their property from the negligent operations of such carriers."

In Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, the
court held that a provision requiring automobile insurance against
liability to third persons did not violate the due process or commerce clauses. The Court said at page 365:
"Requirements of this sort are clearly within the authority of the
State, which may demand compensation for the special facilities it has
provided and regulate the use of its highways to promote the public
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safety. Reasonable' regulations to that end are valid as to intrastate
traffic and, when there is no discrimination against the interstate commerce which may be affected, do not impose an unconstitutional burden
upon that commerce."
The Supreme Court has not directly passed on the question
of whether a State may require insurance of cargo or passengers
transported in motor vehicles in interstate commerce but its decisions indicate that such a requirement would be unconstitutional.
In Michigan Public Utilities Commission v. Duke, 266 U. S.
570, the court held that a private carrier of property could not be
converted by legislation into a common carrier and required to
furnish an indemnity bond covering cargo carried by it in interstate
commerce. The Court said:
"Clearly, these requirements have no relation to public safety or
order in the use of motor vehicles upon the highways, or to the collection
of compensation for the use of the highways. The police power does
not extend so far."
In Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163, the Court, in passing
on an Indiana compulsory insurance requirement said at page 172,
"Such provisions for insurance are not, even as applied to buses
engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, an unreasonable burden on
commerce, if limited to damages suffered within the State by persons
other than the passenger."
In Sage v. Baldwin, 55 Fed. (2d) 968 (N. D. Tex.) and Cobb
v. Department of Public Works, 60 Fed. (2d) 631 (W. D. Wash.),
it was held that statutory requirements for automobile cargo and
passenger insurance violated the commerce clause. The same ruling
as to cargo insurance was made in Johnson Transfer & Freight
Lines v. Perry, 47 Fed. (2d) 900 (N. D. Ga.). In Red Ball Transit
Co. v. Marshall, 8 Fed. (2d) 635 (S. D. Ohio), a compulsory insurance requirement was held invalid under the commerce clause,
but the opinion does not disclose the type of insurance involved.
In Williams v. Denney, 151 Wash. 630, 276 Pac. 858, the
Washington Supreme Court specifically rejected the distinction
made by the federal courts between insurance against liability to
third persons and persons and property carried. It held both provisions good under the commerce clause. In In Re Opinion of the
Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 the justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court held that Massachusetts compulsory insurance provisions were valid in their entirety. It is not wholly clear that insurance of passengers and property carried was required although
the provision seems sufficiently broad to include it. In In Re Opin-
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ion of the Justices, 81 N. H. 566, 129 Atl. 117 the justices of the
New Hampshire Supreme Court gave an opinion that a New Hampshire bill then pending requiring compulsory motor vehicle insurance was constitutional. It is not clear from the opinion What
kind of insurance was required. The opinion was cited in Williams
v. Denney, supra, as holding passenger and cargo insurance valid.
It is our opinion that Section 10(b) of the proposed Uniform
Aviation Liability Act requiring insurance to cover liability to passengers is unconstitutional as applied to interstate operations of
aircraft.
We are further of the opinion that the decisions of the Supreme
Court in Hicklin v. Coney 290 U. S. 169 and Continental Baking
Co. v. Woodring, 286 U. S. 352, upholding the validity of compulsory automobile insurance against liability to third persons or
their property, are not applicable to aircraft. The opinions in these
cases disclose that the State's jurisdiction to require automobile
insurance to protect third persons was based upon its control of
highway facilities furnished by it. In the Woodring case, the Court
said that the statutory requirement was clearly within the authority
of the State "which may demand compensation for the special
facilities it has provided and regulate the use of its highways to
promote the public safety."
Navigable air space is more nearly analogous to navigable
waters than to highways or railroads. The difference in the power
of States to legislate with reference to industries using state roads,
as compared with industries using navigable waters, has been recognized. In Moran v. New Orleans, 112 U. S. 69, the Supreme
Court held invalid a New Orleans ordinance requiring payment
of a license fee by a person operating tow boats between the Gulf
of Mexico and the City of New Orleans. The Court said at page
75:
"The sole occupation sought to be subjected to the tax is that of
using and enjoying the license of the United States to employ these
particular vessels in the coasting trade; and the State thus seeks to
burden, with an exaction, fixed at its own pleasure, the very right to
which the plaintiff in error is entitled under, and which he derives from,
the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Railroad Company v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, involved the

validity of a provision in the charter of a railroad company requiring it to pay to the state of incorporation a portion of its earnings.
The Court said at page 470:
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"Commerce on land between the different states is so strikingly dissimilar in many respects from commerce on water that it is often difficult
to regard them in the same aspect in reference to the respective constitutional powers and duties of the state and federal governments ...
Nature has prepared to hand that portion of the instrumentality employed. The navigable waters of the earth are recognized public highways of trade and intercourse. No franchise is needed to enable the
navigator to use them. Again, the vehicles of commerce by water being
instruments of intercommunication with other nations, the regulation of
them is assumed by the National legislature. So that State interference
with transportation by water, and especially by sea, is at once clearly
marked and distinctly discernible. But it is different with transportation
by land."
In the January, 1932, issue of the JOURNAL OF AIR LAW (Vol.
III, page 1) there is an able article on the subject of "Constitutionality of State Registration of Interstate Aircraft," by Edwin F.
Albertsworth, Professor of Industrial and Constitutional Law,
Northwestern University School of Law. The author says at
page 2:
"While, historically, as between railway regulations by the States
and those now being placed upon air transport, there are similar stages
in legal and constitutional development, it should be stated at once that
the two types of business activity are not at all alike so as to make
applicable to air transport analogous decisions relating to railways. Nor
can similar analogies be drawn from motor bus operations between the
States, or communication agencies, or Pullman service, or refrigerator
transit by means of rail facilities. It is my judgment that some of the
precedents that have come down to us on constitutional issues decided
by the Federal Supreme Court relating to some of these types of
activity in interstate or foreign commerce, are not pertinent to air transport. For carriage of passengers or goods by air is totally dissimilar
in character from that by land, so far as State regulations and constitutional provisions of Federal control are concerned. In the case of
air transport, aircraft touch land only incidentally and temporarily, and
require no artificial roadway, of any character. No franchise is necessary to enable the aircraft owner or operator to use the air, for air is
prepared by nature as a public or common highway for trade and intercourse. No grants are necessary from the State, either of land or
subsidies, for carrying on the air transport business in interstate commerce, unless it be in the exceptional cases of airports."
After reviewing numerous authorities, the author reaches the
conclusion that statutes of several States imposing registration
requirements and charges upon aircraft engaged in interstate commerce cannot be sustained either as property taxes or privilege
taxes or under the police powers of a State.
In Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34, the Court passed
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on a Pennsylvania statute requiring persons other than railroads
or steamship companies, engaged within the State in the sale of
steamship tickets for transportation to or from foreign countries,
to procure a license by giving proof of moral character, paying a
small annual fee and filing a bond as surety against fraud or misrepresentation to purchasers. The plaintiff in error was a ticket
agent at Harrisburg, representing four steamship companies operating between the United States and Europe. He was convicted and
fined for violating the State statute. In reversing the judgment
of the Supreme Court of the State, the Court, in a six to three
decision, said at page 36:
"The soliciting of passengers and the sale of steamship tickets and
orders for passage between the United States and Europe constitute a

well-recognized part of foreign commerce. See Davis v. Farmers Cooperative Co., 262 U. S. 312, 315. A state statute which by its necessary
operation directly interferes with or burdens foreign commerce is a
prohibited regulation and invalid, regardless of the purpose with which
it was passed. Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U. S. 189, 199, and
cases cited. Such legislation cannot be sustained as an exertion of the
police power of the State to prevent possible fraud. Real Silk Mills v.
Portland,268 U. S. 325, 336. The Congress has complete and paramount
authority to regulate foreign commerce and, by appropriate measures,

to protect the public against the frauds of those who sell these tickets
and orders. The sales here in question are related to foreign commerce
as directly as are sales made in ticket offices maintained by the carriers
and operated by their servants and employees. The license fee and
other things imposed by the Act on plaintiff in error, who initiates for his
principals a transaction in foreign commerce, constitute a direct burden
on that commerce. This case is controlled by Texas Transport Co. v.
New Orleans, 264 U. S. 150, and McCall v. California, 136 U. S. 104."

A State statute requiring operators of aircraft in interstate
commerce to carry insurance against either ground injury and
damage or passenger liability or cargo liability, certainly imposes
as great a burden on interstate commerce as the Pennsylvania
statute involved in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania imposed on foreign
commerce. The dissenting opinion in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania
emphasized the fact that Congress had not adopted any legislation
designed to protect purchasers of steamship tickets against fraud.
It is also true that Congress has not legislated with reference to
liability to persons injured or damaged by interstate operations of
aircraft, but it has occupied the field to the extent of providing in
the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (49 U. S. C. 180) that the navigable
air space "shall be subject to a public right of freedom of interstate
and foreign air navigation." Furthermore, the Air Commerce Act
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of 1926, as amended (49 U. S. C. 171, et seq.) empowers the
Secretary of Commerce to establish airports, civil airways and air
navigation facilities and to establish air traffic rules. The Secretary
of Commerce, under authority of the Air Commerce Act, has established airports, navigation facilities, civil airways and air traffic
rules and, in so far as civil airways can be compared to public
highways, they fall within the category of public ways established
and maintained by the federal government.
We, therefore, conclude that Section 10 of the proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as
applied to aircraft operated in interstate commerce.
IV.

GENERAL

OBJECTIONS

TO

THE

PROPOSED

UNIFORM

STATE

LEGISLATION WITH REFERENCE TO AVIATION LIABILITY.

Alaska and the District of Columbia and sixteen States have
laws limiting the amount of damages recoverable for death by
wrongful act, ranging from $5000 in Maine and Colorado to $12,500
in Wisconsin. Hawaii and Porto Rico and thirty-two States have
no such statutory limitations. Aviation generally involves passage
over State lines. Scheduled air transportation is principally interstate. The speed of air transportation is such that many States
are frequently traversed during flights of short duration and the
liability of an operator fluctuates from hour to hour on account of
differences in State laws.
This undesirable variation of liability in different states will not
be obviated by the proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act. On
the contrary, the submission of that Act to the states for adoption
will result in new variations in liability and increased confusion.
The Act will be adopted by some states and not by others, and
important sections thereof will be held valid in some states and
invalid in others. The chances are that many years will elapse
before any considerable number of states adopt the statute. The
Uniform Sales Act, which was prepared after experience and judicial precedents extending over many centuries, was submitted to the
states in 1907 and after a lapse of thirty years has been adopted by
thirty-two states.
The Uniform State Law for Aeronautics was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1922 and after fifteen years has been adopted by twenty states,
though the great majority of such states have made modifications
in the text of the original act. The statute was adopted by seven
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states in 1923, one in 1925, two in 1929 and one in 1931, and has
not been adopted by any state since 1931. The proposed Uniform
Aviation Liability Act, which repeals a substantial part of the
Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, and in addition thereto incorporates the highly controversial provisions regarding passenger
liability and, compulsory insurance, can scarcely be expected to
make better progress than the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics,
and especially so in view of the fact that the enactment of the
statute will in all probability be actively opposed and resisted by
every branch of aviation.
Experience with reference to liability without fault and compulsory insurance as applied to automobiles indicates the difficulty
which would be encountered in bringing about the general adoption
of the Uniform Aviation Liability Act. Automobiles have been
in use for approximately thirty-five years. There are nearly thirty
million automobiles in use in the United States. They can be
purchased in secondhand markets for prices as low as the amount
of a state license fee, and innumerable cars are owned and operated
by persons who are financially irresponsible and carry no insurance. They can be and are operated by anyone, including children,
cripples and drunkards, and the number of deaths and injuries
caused by their operation is appalling and is increasing from year
to year. Nevertheless, no state has adopted legislation imposing
liability without fault as to automobiles and only Massachusetts
has provided for compulsory insurance as to private automobiles.*
The fact that legislatures will not adopt measures such as
proposed in the Uniform Aviation Liability Act with respect to
automobiles indicates what their attitude will be with reference
to the radically different situations presented by airplanes. They
are costly and the number in operation is small. Owners and
operators as a rule are financially responsible and commonly carry
insurance. Airplanes cannot be operated for hire in interstate
commerce, and in intrastate commerce in many States, without
being authorized or licensed by the Department of Commerce.
Licensed airplanes must be inspected and maintained by mechanics
licensed by the Department of Commerce and cannot be operated
except by pilots authorized or licensed by the Department of Commerce, and, in order to retain their licenses, pilots and mechanics
must continue to maintain experience, and pilots must pass periodic
physical examinations. (Air Commerce Regulations, Department
* See "Financial Protection for the Motor Accident Victim" in Law and
Contemporary Problems, Vol. III, No. 4, page 505.
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of Commerce, Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7.) Airplanes are carefully maintained and the number of injuries and deaths caused by
their operation is insignificant when compared with the automobile.
The provisions of the Uniform Aviation Liability Act relate
to matters which are the subject of great controversy and difference
of opinion. States have radically different policies as to whether
damages recoverable for death by wrongful act should or should
not be limited and states having such limits differ as to the proper
amount of the limitation. Certainly great difficulty can be anticipated in convincing the legislatures of Maine and Colorado that
an air line causing death by an accident due to the malicious act
of a third person, or a mistake of a Government employee in a
traffic control tower, should be held liable for $10,000, whereas a
person who causes death by driving an automobile on the wrong
side of the road while intoxicated should be held for only $5000.
We, therefore, feel that we are warranted in predicting that
the progress of the proposed statute in state legislatures will be
exceedingly slow. It is possible that during the interval the extent
of federal control over aviation will be increased. Airplanes, like
radio and electricity, do not recognize state lines and federal control of aviation may be extended to include intrastate activities, as
well as interstate commerce. (See Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 257 U. S.
563, 588.)
The reason generally advanced to support the theory that air
transportation should be subjected to liability without fault and
thus be treated differently from all other forms of transportation,
is that claimants find it impossible to prove the cause of accidents.
Department of Commerce records and the reports of litigated cases
do not indicate that such impossibility exists. On the contrary, in
most accidents, circumstantial, if not direct, proof can be produced
to establish causes. In fatal accidents, the Department of Commerce publishes statements explaining circumstances and probable
causes and these reports are available to claimants. In reported
aviation cases, courts and juries have reached conclusions as to the
causes of accidents and claimants have recovered in a majority
of such cases.
Even if it were true that it is generally or frequently impossible to prove the cause of airplane accidents, the appropriate remedy would be to shift the burden of proof to the owner, instead of
providing that he shall be subject to liability irrespective of neg-
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ligence, unless the accident has been caused by the wilful misconduct
of the claimant.
Miscellaneous flying would be greatly handicapped and retarded if the proposed Act were generally adopted. Miscellaneous
flyers are not capable of bearing the financial burden that would be
imposed by liability without fault and compulsory insurance. It is
obviously highly desirable for the public welfare that private flying
be encouraged.
Domestic air lines have thus far been unable to earn an adequate
return on invested capital and should not be handicapped by the
imposition of unnecessary costs. The Uniform Act would unquestionably increase their insurance rates and the public would derive
no benefit whatever from the insurance requirement. Scheduled
air lines now carry insurance far in excess of the requirements of
the proposed statute and the only effect of the new legislation
would be to increase rates.
In Pokora v. Wabash Railway Co., 292 U. S. 98, the Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo, considered standards
of prudent conduct which should be observed by persons in crossing railroad tracks. At page 105, the Court said:
"Illustrations such as these bear witness to the need for caution in
framing standards of behavior that amount to rules of law. The need
is the more urgent when there is no background of experience out of
which the standards have emerged. They are then, not the natural
flowerings of behavior in its customary forms, but rules artificially
developed, and imposed from without. Extraordinary situations may
not wisely or fairly be subjected to tests or regulations that are fitting
for the common-place or normal. In default of the guide of customary
conduct, what is suitable for the traveler caught in a mesh where the
ordinary safeguards fail him is for the judgment of a jury."

Aviation has no background of experience out of which standards of conduct have emerged. The industry is new, but is making
unprecedented progress. By the time the proposed statute has been
approved by the American Law Institute, the National Conference
of Commissioners and the American Bar Association, and has been
adopted by a single state, the statute may be obsolete and wholly
inappropriate because of progress that will be made by aviation
during the interval. The facts to which the proposed law will be
applied a few years in the future are not known and cannot be
predicted. Liability in aviation cases should be left to courts and
juries and should not be imposed from without by a statute which
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will be only partially adopted by legislatures and partially sustained
by courts over a period of many years.
The Committee has received a communication under date of
August 14, 1937, from Dr. D. Goedhuis, Manager of the Central
Office at The Hague, of International Air Traffic Association. Dr.
Goedhuis states that he has examined a copy of the proposed Uniform Aviation Liability Act and points out that the theory of
liability under that Act is completely different from the Warsaw
Convention which was adhered to by the United States on October
29, 1934. He says in part:
"The fact that the U. S. A. have adhered to the Warsaw Convention
proves in my opinion, that the U. S. A. also realizes the necessity of
submitting the Air Carrier to a regime based on fault. The recognition
of this principle in International carriage entails as an inevitable consequence the recognition of the same principle in National Air Carriage.
The particular character of aviation makes a distinction between these
two kinds of carriage impossible. To give an example: If a passenger
traveling by air from Brownsville to New York suffers damage owing
to the plane being struck by lightning, the carrier will, by virtue of the
proposed Uniform State Law be liable; if however the passenger started
his journey at Tampico, the carrier in the same case will not be liable
because he will fall under the rules of the Warsaw Convention which
stipulate that the carrier is not liable when he proves that he and his
representatives have taken the necessary measures to avoid the damage.
As the tendency of countries all over the world is to apply the rules
of the Warsaw Convention also to National Air Carriage, it is obvious
that air carriers in the U. S. A. would be in a very unfavorable position
as compared to air carriers in other parts of the world, if an absolute
liability was imposed upon them."

Dr. Goedhuis submitted with his letter a report made by him
in July, 1937, at the twenty-fourth meeting of I. A. T. A. at Paris,
relating to the progress made in various countries with reference
to the application of the rules of the Warsaw Convention to national carriage. This report contains the following summary:
"To summarize, there are thus three countries [Italy, Belgium and
Holland] which have already applied the rules of the Warsaw Convention to their internal legislation.
In twelve countries [Brazil, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
Argentine, Esthonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Switzerland], the application of the rules of the Warsaw Convention to internal
carriage is to be expected in the near future.
In eight countries [Austria, Bulgaria, China, Greece, Rumania, England, Australia and Ireland] the question is being studied at the moment.
In four countries [South Africa, Chile, Japan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics] the application of the Warsaw Convention to internal

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
carriage is not being considered, and in one country [United States of

America] we are without information on this subject."

The Warsaw Convention is applicable to flights between the
United States and other countries which have ratified or adhered
to the Convention. It is true that flights from foreign countries,
other than Mexico and Canada, usually terminate at coastal points,
but the range of aircraft has been increased to such an extent that
this may not be true in the near future. Furthermore, many of the
domestic airlines in the United States have inter-line agreements
with foreign air carriers under which through tickets may be sold
for transportation in the United States, as well as to and from
foreign countries. Transportation under such through tickets for
flight between countries which have ratified or adhered to the Warsaw Convention will be governed by the rules of the Convention
and not by State law. Therefore, departure from the principles
of the Warsaw Convention by State legislation will result in situations in which radically different rules of liability will be applied
to different passengers on the same trip.
V.

A.

THE UNIFORM LAW OF AIRFLIGHT.

Lawfulness of Flight, Section 2, Pages 24-25, Lines 1 to 18.
"2. Flight of aircraft in this state is lawful:
(a) If in compliance with the laws of this state regulating aeronautics and, as far as applicable, with such laws of the United States; and
(b) If at a height permitted by the rules, regulations or orders
adopted and promulgated by the state [Aeronautical Commission], and
the applicable rules of the Department of Commerce of the United
States; and
(c) Unless so conducted as to involve a substantial risk of harm
to individuals or property on the land; or
(d) Unless so conducted as to constitute a substantial interference
with the then existing use and enjoyment of the land or structures on
the land or space over the land or adversely affect the then existing
value of the land and structures thereon."

Flight of aircraft in the United States is recognized as lawful
by federal and state legislation, international agreements and conventions and court decisions (Section 10, Air Commerce Act of
1926, 49 U. S. C. 180; Section 4 Uniform State Law for Aeronautics, in force in 20 States; Article IV Habana Convention;
Smith v. New England Aircraft Company, Inc., 270 Mass. 511;
170 N. E. 385, 389; Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173
S. E. 817, 819; Swetland v. Curtis Airports Corporation, 55 Fed.
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(2d) 201, 6th C. C. A.; Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 Fed.
(2d) 755, 9th C. C. A.; Section 194 of Restatement of the Law of
Torts by American Law Institute). Further legislation providing
for the lawfulness of flight in general, therefore, would only confirm existing law.
The lower limits to which flight of aircraft is lawful is the
principal subject of controversy and although courts have passed
upon this question in a few cases, it has not been adjudicated with
sufficient finality to be considered free from doubt. In arriving
at a legislative solution of the problem, it is not necessary to consider the various theories advanced as to the correlative rights of
operators of aircraft and landowners.* It is sufficient to know that
controversies as to the lower limits of lawful flight arise and how
the courts have dealt with them in the past.
Litigation affecting the right of flight has usually been instituted by landowners in the vicinities of airports where airplanes
are necessarily flown low over adjacent property in taking-off and
landing. In dealing with these cases, the courts have balanced the
conveniences of the public and the interests of all parties concerned
in arriving at their decisions, although some have indicated a hesitancy in recognizing this doctrine where extremely low flights are
involved (see dicta in Smith v. New England Aircraft Company,
270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385, 392, and in Thrasher v. City of
Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817, 826). On the other hand, the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit has held
that flights as low as 5 feet above the surface will not be enjoined
in the absence of proof by the surface owner of actual damage.
(Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 Fed. (2d) 755, 758.)
In Smith v. New England Aircraft Company, 270 Mass. 511,
170 N. E. 385, the owners of a country estate located near a
privately operated airport sought an injunction to prevent defendants from flying over their lands and buildings in such manner
as to constitute a trespass and nuisance and to prevent the use
of the airport as a base for such flights. The plaintiffs did not seek
a recovery of damages. The Court refused to grant an injunction
,ind said at page 393:
"The finding of the master is express to the effect that the plaintiffs
have not shown that they have sustained any damage to their property
or its use, or have suffered material discomfort. The kind of land upon
which the trespass is committed is also an important factor. As already
* For a discussion of these theories see "Adjusting the Conflicting Interests
of Landowner and Aviator In Anglo-American Law," Edward C. Sweeney,
3 JOURNAL or AIR LAW, 829, 585.
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stated, that of the plaintiffs affected by flights at low altitudes is covered
with dense brush and woods. It is uncultivated. It does not appear that
any valuable use is made of it either for pleasure or profit. That might
not be a factor of consequence in an action at law for the assessment
of damages. See C. W. Hunt Co. v. Boston Elevated Railway, 199 Mass.
220, 236, 237, 85 N. E. 446. But it is a factor to be taken into account
with all the others in determining whether injunctive relief ought to be
afforded. In view of all these conditions, injunctive relief is not granted."

In Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corporation,55 Fed. (2d) 201,
6th C. C. A., the owners of country residential property instituted
suit to enjoin flights of aircraft over their property and the operation of a nearby private airport. The District Court (41 Fed. (2d)
929) enjoined the defendants from permitting dust to fly or drift
in substantial and annoying quantities from the airport over the
plaintiffs' property, from dropping or distributing circulars from
airplanes as they passed over it and from flying or permitting airplanes under their control to fly over it at an altitude of less than
500 feet, this limitation being premised upon minimum altitudes
prescribed by the United States Department of Commerce. Plaintiffs appealed from so much of the decree as refused to enjoin
flights over their property entirely, and defendants appealed from
that part of the decree which enjoined flights below 500 feet.
In discussing that part of the decree which enjoined flights
below 500 feet, the Court said at page 203:
"As to the upper stratum which he [the land-owner] may not reasonably expect to occupy, he has no right, it seems to us, except to prevent the use of it by others to the extent of an unreasonable interference
with his complete enjoyment of the surface. His remedy for this latter
use, we think, is an action for nuisance and not trespass. We cannot fix
a definite and unvarying height below which the surface owner may
reasonably expect to occupy the air space for himself. That height is
to be determined upon the particular facts of each case. It is sufficient
for this case that the flying of the defendants over the plaintiff's property was not within the zone of such expected use. We think the question is unaffected by the regulation promulgated by the Department of
Commerce, under the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (49 U. S. C. A. Sec.
171 et seq.), and adopted by the State of Ohio, requiring aeronauts to
fly in rural sections at a height not less than 500 feet above the surface,
for in our view that regulation does not determine the rights of the
surface owner, either as to trespass or nuisance."

The Court also held that the decree should be modified insofar
as operation of the airport was concerned and said on that subject
at page 204:
"It is true that there are cases in which the land-owner must submit

PROPOSED LAW OF AIRFLIGHT
to great annoyance in the interest of the public. This is not that character of case, for there is no showing that this site is indispensable to
the public interest; indeed, it appears that the defendants have already
acquired another site and may acquire still another, if they desire it,
either of which is as accessible to Cleveland as the present field. Considering, therefore, the balance of conveniences, the defendants are not
entitled to use the property as they now contemplate. The record does
not contain sufficient evidence to determine whether other parts of the
property could be used without seriously interfering with the plaintiffs'
enjoyment of their properties. That question we leave open for consideration by the trial court upon the remand of the case. It is sufficient
for present purposes that the defendants should be enjoined 'from operating the airport as now located."

In Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 178 Ga. 514, 173 S. E. 817,
plaintiff owned and occupied property near the Municipal Airport
of the City of Atlanta. He instituted a suit against the City and
several aircraft operators for an injunction and damages, claiming
that the operation of the airport and flights over his land constituted
a nuisance. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed a judgment
of the trial court, sustaining a demurrer to plaintiff's petition, but
said with respect to the right of flight over plaintiff's property, at

page 826:
"Perhaps the owner of the land may be considered as being in actual
possession of the space immediately covering the trees, buildings, and
structures affixed to the soil, so that the act of navigating a plane through
this stratum could be condemned as a trespass; but that is not a question
for decision in the present case, and obviously we should not here attempt to define the altitude at which aerial navigation might be considered as constituting such an offense. It is sufficient to say that the
flight of aircraft across the land of another cannot be said to be a
trespass without taking into consideration the question of altitude. It
might or might not amount to a trespass, according to the circumstances
including the degree of altitude, and even when the act does not constitute
a trespass, it could be a nuisance, as where it 'worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage,' to the preferred claimant, namely, the owner of the
soil, or to a rightful occupant thereof."
In the recent case of Hinman v. Pacific Air Transport, 84 Fed.

(2d) 755, 9th C. C. A., the issue of right of flight was clearly
presented. The plaintiffs filed a bill to enjoin the defendant air
line from flying over their property and claimed damages in the
total sum of $90,000, computed on the basis of a charge of $1,500

a month for previous use and occupancy of courses of flight over
the plaintiffs' land. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a decree
of the District Court sustaining a general demurrer to the bill and
certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court (300
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U. S. 655).

In its opinion the Court of Appeals said at page 758:

"We now consider the allegation of the bill that appellees' airplanes,
in landing, glide through the air, within a distance of less than 100 feet
to the surface of appellants' land, or possibly to a distance within five
feet thereof, at one end of his tract. This presents another question for
discussion. Whether such close proximity to appellants' land may constitute an impairment of his full enjoyment of the same is a question
of fact. If it does, he may be entitled to relief in a proper case.
Appellants are not entitled to injunctive relief upon the bill filed
here, because no facts are alleged with respect to circumstances of
appellants' use of the premises which will enable this court to infer that
any actual or substantial damage will accrue from the acts of the
appellees complained of."

In Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 Fed. Supp. 977 (Dist.
Ct. Western Dist. of New York) the court summarized numerous
decisions relating to the law of flight and said at page 982:
"It is unnecessary to review in any detail the many divergent views
of authors and textbook writers on the subject. Out of it all has grown
the rule followed in the foregoing decisions and adapted to the economic
and social needs of our times that the owner of land has the exclusive
right to so much of the space above as may be actually occupied and used
by him and necessarily incident to such occupation and use, and any one
passing through such space without the owner's consent is a trespasser;
as to the air space above that actually occupied and used and necessarily
incident to such occupation and use, the owner of the surface may prevent its use by others in so far as that use unreasonably interfered with
his complete enjoyment of the surface and the space above which he
occupies, on the theory of nuisance."
Tucker v. United Air Lines, Inc. and City of Iowa City (Dist.
Ct. of Johnson County, Iowa, Sept. 14, 1935), JOURNAL OF AIR
LAW, Vol. 6, page 622, and Vol 7, page 293, involved the legality

of obstructions by a landowner, as well as the right of flight.

An

owner of land adjacent to a municipal airport sued to enjoin flights
over his property at low altitudes. The defendant air line sued
to enjoin the landowner from maintaining poles and trees on his
property near the airport boundary. The cases were consolidated.
The Court enjoined the defendant air line from flying over plaintiff's property at altitudes of less than 30 feet at one location and
at altitudes of less than 50 feet at other locations. The Court also
found that the trees and poles were a hazard to aviation and enjoined the landowner

from maintaining the same at heights in

excess of 25 feet at points where flight below 30 feet was enjoined
and 50 feet at other locations.
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In the Tucker case the Court was confronted with a situation
which necessitated a balancing of conveniences. The airport was
public and owned by a municipality and had been used for many
years in connection with the operation of a transcontinental air mail
line. It represented a large capital investment. The air line was
a common carrier of passengers and express, and carried mail for
the United States Government. One effect of the decision was
that the landowner erected a pole about 242 feet in height at the
end of a runway. As a result the air line, with the consent of the
Post Office Department, eliminated Iowa City as an air mail stop.
Distances cannot be measured with exactness from a rapidly moving airplane and there was a danger that pilots in their efforts to
comply with the decree would fly at altitudes substantially in excess
of those permitted and thus incur the risk of injury in landing.
There was also danger of collision with the pole and the further
danger that a pilot would have his attention diverted from operation
of an airplane because of the necessity of avoiding the pole and
maintaining an altitude complying with the court's decree.
A question somewhat similar to that in the Tucker case arose
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvaniav. Von Bestecki, (Court of Common Pleas, Dauphin County, Penn., March 15, 1937), where the
court held that the erection of towers on land adjoining an airport.
"and the resultant menace to the public traveling on the civil airways,
constituted a public nuisance, the recurrence of which may be enjoined
by a court of equity."

Probably the circumstances in no two cases will ever be exactly
alike. The answer as to what are the lower limits of lawful flight
cannot equitably be determined in advance either by the courts or
by legislation. If the land involved is vacant, a different rule should
be applied to determine lawfulness of flight than if it is being used
for a proper purpose. The extent of injury or interference with a
surface owner's rights will always depend on the use that he is
-making of his property. On the other hand, airplanes must
fly over private property. They represent a social and economic
necessity, varying in importance according to the purpose for which
flown. Also, they must land and take-off and in so doing it is
unavoidable that they fly over adjacent property at rates of ascent
or descent varying approximately from 7 feet to 12 or more feet
laterally for every one foot vertically, depending upon the elevation of the airport above sea level, the wind velocity and the type
of airplane used. (See United States Department of Commerce
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Airport Rating Regulations, Sec. 4(b), effective Sept. 1, 1930; 1930
U. S. Av. R. 342, 346.)
In dusting operations flights are conducted at very low altitudes and the land to be subjected to such operations cannot be
approached without flight at low altitudes over adjacent lands
For this reason, Iowa, essentially an agricultural State, incorporated in a statutory prohibition against flights (after take-off and
before landing) at less than 500 feet, an exception reading: "except where indispensable to an industrial flying operation." (Code
of Iowa, 1931, Sec. 8338-c7).
It has been suggested that larger airports be used in order that
landings and take-offs can be made further in-field, so that flights
over adjoining property will be at higher altitudes. This is impracticable. On July 1, 1935, there were 2343 airports and landing
fields in the United States (Department of Commerce, Aeronautics
Bulletin No. 1, page 20). A tremendous amount of land would
have to be added to airports to carry out the suggestion and adjoining landowners would not benefit materially. Consider, for
example, an airport measuring 3000 feet along each of its four
sides, and assume a gliding angle of one foot vertically for every
7 feet laterally. If the airport were extended 700 feet from each
side, an airplane would cross the boundary in landing approximately
100 feet higher than without the extension. The net result would
be (1) more than 10,000,000 square feet of additional land would
have to be acquired and maintained for an airport originally covering only 9,000,000 square feet; (2) an economic waste would result
by reason of the land surface not being fully utilized; and (3)
flights at low altitude over adjoining property would still be necessary. It should also be remembered that flights over property adjacent to airports are of exceedingly short duration, cover very
small areas, and are made from time to time in different directions
because of the necessity of landing and taking-off against the wind.
For the foregoing reasons, it is submitted that the proposed
Uniform Law of Airflight should be so drafted as to recognize fully
a right of flight at all altitudes and to permit adjudications by the
courts as to what the lower limits shall be under the circumstances
of particular cases, giving proper consideration to the character of
flights, the conduct thereof, the use being made of underlying land,
the amount of interference therewith by such flights, and the public
interest involved.
Section 2 of the proposed statute does not make any exception
as to public aircraft, though such an exception is made in Sec-
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tion 3(c). Section 2 provides by implication that flight, contrary
to its terms, is unlawful, but nevertheless the landowner probably
would not have any satisfactory remedy if such unlawful flight
were conducted by the Army or Navy or by the State.
Section 2(a) makes the lawfulness of flight dependent upon
compliance with federal and state laws regulating aeronautics. This
is unnecessary and not expedient because in almost every case noncompliance with laws regulating aeronautics will have no proximate
connection with wrongs claimed by landowners to have been caused
by flights over their property. Laws regulating aeronautics ordinarily contain enforcement provisions and often prescribe penalties
for violations. For example, Section 3(a) of the proposed Uniform Law of Airflight prohibits operation of aircraft without the
consent of the owner, and under Section 4 violation of this provision is punishable by fine and imprisonment. If Section 2(a)
were in effect, a court might hold that a person operating an airplane without the consent of the owner was not only subject to
such penalty, but also to civil claims by landowners, though there
would be no relationship whatever between the offense and the
wrong claimed by the landowner. Numerous similar examples
could be mentioned, such as violation during flight of federal public
health regulations and the failure of an operator to maintain lights
on an airplane during a night flight, as required by federal regulations.
Dean John H. Wigmore, in commenting upon a similar provision in the Fourth Revised Tentative Draft of the Joint Committees, said:
"The 4th Draft, par. (a) and (b) requires 'compliance with the
Federal and State laws and regulations' as a condition of lawfulness.
But the only requirement should be the certification of airworthiness

for the craft and of competence for the navigator. These alone should
suffice for lawfulness. The Federal Air Commerce Act declares that

'a public right or freedom of transit through the airspace exists foevery citizen.'
To make lawfulness depend upon compliance from moment to
moment with all the laws and regulations both Federal and State is
contrary to all analogies of law and is unpractical.
(a) In no other branch of traffic-pedestrian or vehicular or marine
is any such legal principle recognized.
(b) There are hundreds of regulations for behavior during transit.
To suppose that a person's general status of lawfulness disappears
the moment he is failing to obey any one of them would involve an
intolerable burden and an unpractical result. A pedestrian is still lawfully on the highway even though he is violating an ordinance against

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
expectorating on the sidewalk or against carrying a concealed weapon.
A truck-driver is still lawfully on the highway even though he is transporting a gambling-table or has failed to turn on his lights or is transporting a patent medicine illegally labeled. In all such cases the specific
act may be a ground for prosecution. But nobody ever supposed that it
took away the general lawfulness of the person's being in the highway.
Today, the extensive air traffic is conducted on the assumption that
when the craft and the pilot hold duly issued certificates or licenses, they
are deemed entitled to fly and to be lawfully in the air, without further
condition. Last year the craft and the pilots of the scheduled air lines
alone carried 1,140,000 passengers and flew 400,000,000 miles. Day and
night they cross the land in every region. To assert that these men and
craft are not to be deemed lawfully in the air until they can prove that
they have complied with every Federal and State law and regulation
would be preposterous. No such law could possibly be contemplated."
(Comments and Redraft by John H. Wigmore, Jan., 1937.)
And in discussing the language of the present Section 2(a)
he said:
"This section declares flight lawful only when done in compliance
'with the laws of this State' and of the U. S. and 'the rules * * * of the
State Aeronautical Commission' and the U. S. Department of Commerce.
Think of it! If transgressing any one of several hundred rules, the
whole status of the aircraft becomes unlawful! And the burden is on
the craft to prove compliance with all those rules!"
(Second Comment by John H. Wigmore-March 15, 1937.)

Dean Wigmore has suggested the following in lieu of Sections 2(a) and (b):
"Flight of aircraft in the airspace over the land of this State is
lawful
(a) when made by an aircraft operated under a valid certificate or
license or registration issued by the Federal Secretary of Commerce or
by the State Aeronautic Commission of this or another State or Territory, or a District or insular possession of the United States.
(b) and navigated by a pilot holding a certificate or license or
registration validly issued by such authority." (Comments and Redraft
by John H. Wigmore, Jan., 1937.)
Such provisions are not objectionable, but they are not necessary because the subject is adequately covered by Sections 2 and 3
of the Uniform Aeronautical Regulatory Act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
the American Bar Association in July, 1935 (See 1936 U. S. Av.
R. 384). Section 2(a) therefore should be deleted from the proposed Uniform Law of Airflight.
The provisions of Section 2(b), that flight is lawful if at a
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height permitted by the rules of the State Aeronautical Commission and the Department of Commerce, would result in confusion
when applied to particular cases. Would the federal or state laws
and regulations be applicable when they conflict? When regulations
or laws do not specify minimum altitudes of flight, but refer thereto
in general language, what meaning shall the courts ascribe to Section 2(b) which measures lawfulness by permitted height?
The Federal Air Commerce Regulations (U. S. Department of
Commerce Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7) provide:
"(1) The minimum safe altitudes of flight in taking off or landing
and while flying over the property of another in taking off or landing,
are those at which such flights by aircraft may be made without being in
dangerous proximity to persons or property on the land or water beneath,

or unsafe to the aircraft.
(2) Minimum safe altitudes of flight over congested parts of cities,
towns, or settlements are those sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe
emergency landing, but in no case less than 1,000 feet.
(3) The minimum safe altitudes of flight in all other cases shall
be not less than 500 feet." (Section 69.)
*

*:

*

*:

*

"The air-traffic rules may be deviated from when special circumstances render a departure necessary to avoid immediate danger or when
such departure is required because of stress of weather conditions or
other unavoidable causes: Provided, however, That aircraft carrying
passengers for hire shall not deviate from the air traffic rules pertaining
to minimum altitudes of flight because of stress of weather conditions."
(Sec. 79.)
"The Secretary of Commerce may waive any of the requirements of
these regulations when, in his discretion, the particular facts justify such
waiver." (Sec. 82.)

Federal regulations governing scheduled operation of interstate
air line services (Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7-E) provide, with
reference to visual or contact flying in daylight:
"Authority to so operate may be granted, provided that; * * *
(C) At no time is the airplane flown within 500 feet of the ground,
the tops or sides of mountains, hills, or other obstructions to flight, except
during landings and take-offs.
(D) A waiver of the 500-foot minimum altitude requirement of the
air traffic rules may be granted when terrain and equipment permit and
ceiling conditions make it advisable, provided that written approval is
obtained from the Bureau of Air Commerce for the operating division
concerned. When such permission by waiver has been authorized, the
course of aircraft shall be directed so as to avoid populated areas of
cities, villages and settlements. Under no circumstances will authority
be granted for flights below 300 feet." (Ch. 8, Sec. 5.)
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On occasions the Secretary of Commerce promulgates special
rules. An example is a regulation approved December '5, 1936,
effective to December 18, 1936 (1 Fed. Reg. 2100-2101) providing
that during the Ninth Annual All-American Air Maneuvers:
"(a) Eastern Air Lines operating between Jacksonville and Miami
will fly on all trips day or night, between 4,000 and 6,000 feet altitudes
above sea level and will maintain courses as nearly as possible to the
center of the Department of Commerce radio ranges between its points.
(b) National Airlines System operating between St. Petersburg,
Daytona Beach, and Jacksonville will similarly remain under 1,000 feet
altitude above sea level.
(c) All other aircraft will use the altitude from 4,000 to 6,000 feet
only when climbing or descending through this level and remain in this
line the shortest practicable period of time."

Compare the foregoing Federal regulations with the following
statutory requirements of the State of Iowa:
"Exclusive to taking off from or landing on an established landing
field, airport, or on property designated for that purpose by the owner,
and except as otherwise permitted by this chapter, aircraft shall not
be flown1. Over the congested parts of cities, towns, or settlements, except
at a height sufficient to permit of a reasonably safe emergency landing,
which in no case shall be less than one thousand feet.
2. Elsewhere at height less than five hundred feet, except where
indispensable to an industrial flying operation." (Code of Iowa, 1931,
Sec. 8338-c7.)

Section 2(b) would make flight unlawful if at a height lower
that that permitted by state regulations and the applicable rules
of the United States Department of Commerce. Under the foregoing regulations an interstate airplane might be flown in Iowa
by an airline at an altitude of 400 feet in compliance with Federal
regulations but not in compliance with regulations specified in the
Iowa Statute. On the other hand under a special regulation, such
as the one of December 5, 1936, referred to above, requiring particular interstate airline airplanes to operate at altitudes between
4,000 and 6,000 feet, an airplane of such airline operated at 1,000
feet would comply with the state regulations but would violate
Federal regulations.
Variations in minimum altitude regulations as mentioned above
indicate the impracticability of premising the right of flight thereon
insofar as the interests of underlying landowners are concerned.
An airplane flown for one purpose could under such a test fly
lawfully at an altitude at which it would be unlawful for another
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airplane to fly, yet both would have relatively the same effect with
respect to underlying property. At extremely low altitudes, particularly with reference to taking-off and landing, the regulations
do not attempt to define precisely the minimum heights permitted.
In each such case the circumstances surrounding the flight must
control, and this is the view-as we have suggested-that should
be recognized in the proposed Uniform Law of Airflight with
respect to flights at all altitudes.
The minimum safe altitude regulations not only vary according
lo conditions but bear very little relationship to the correlative
rights of flight and the rights of owners of underlying land. The
lack of relationship was recognized by the court in the Swetland
case, supra, as previously noted herein, in the following language:
"We think the question is unaffected by the regulations promulgated
by the Department of Commerce, under the Air Commerce Act of 1926
(49 U. S. C. A. Sec. 71 et seq.), and adopted by the State of Ohio, requiring aeronauts to fly in rural sections at a height not less than 500
feet above the surface, for in our view that regulation does not determine
the rights of the surface owners, either as to trespass or nuisance."
(55 Fed. (2d) 201, 203.)
Minimum safe altitude regulations should not be used to measure the correlative rights of flight and the ownership of land because such regulations are promulgated primarily with a view to
safety in aircraft operation and not for the purpose of defining the.
rights of surface owners. This is indicated by the following provision of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 (49 U. S. C. 173 (e)):
"The Secretary of Commerce shall by regulation-* * * establish
air traffic rules for the navigation, protection, and identification of aircraft, including rules as to safe altitudes of flight and rules for the
prevention of collisions between vessels and aircraft."
There are very good reasons for requiring airplanes to operate
above prescribed minimum altitudes. As long as an airplane is
not in the close proximity to the ground or ground structures or
other aircraft and is proceeding under proper control no harm is
likely to result to anyone. But, should there be a motor failure
requiring an immediate forced landing, the pilot will have more
time and a larger area within which to land if he is flying high
than if he is flying low. The reason for this is that without power
but with control of his airplane otherwise, a pilot can glide in any
direction or directions at a theoretical rate of descent in calm
air at sea level of one foot for every seven feet of lateral travel.
If he is 1,000 feet above the ground he can reach a point as far
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away as 7,000 feet, and can possibly turn as much as 360 degrees
in seeking a landing place. If he is at 500 feet he can glide 3,500
feet and possibly turn as -much as 180 degrees. If he is at 100 feet
he can glide 700 feet but can make only a very slight turn and
possibly none at all. Therefore, the higher he is, the less likelihood of injury to himself or others in cases of forced landings.
It is seldom, however, that the height of flight affects land directly
underlying the airplane when it commences a forced landing; it
will normally land elsewhere, particularly if it is flying low, because
of the necessity of descending at an angle as described above.
Inasmuch as regulations relating to minimum altitudes of flight
are promulgated under laws containing enforcement provisions, it
is unnecessary to prescribe the lawfulness or unlawfulness of flights
below such altitudes; and since such regulations vary under differing conditions of flight, are promulgated primarily with a view to
safety in aircraft operation, and bear no necessary relationship to
the reasonableness of flights over private property, Section 2 (b)
should be eliminated from the proposed Uniform Law of Airflight.
Section 2 (d) provides in, part that flight is lawful unless so
conducted "as to constitute a substantial interference with the then
existing use and enjoyment of the land." This provision unduly
restricts lawfulness of flight because it does not take into consideration the reasonableness or unreasonableness of interference with
the use of property on the ground. It does not recognize that conveniences should be balanced to the end that only those flights which
unreasonably interfere with proper use of surface property should
be held to be unlawful. -As above pointed out, this is the rule
that has been applied by the courts and represents a social policy
as they have determined it. We see no reason for a legislative
alteration in that policy. Accordingly, we suggest that the words
"a substantial interference" in Section 2 (d) be changed to "an
unreasonable interference," and in order to discourage the erection
of unnecessary and "spite fence" obstructions to lawful flights, such
as were involved in the Tucker and Von Bestecki cases, supra, the
words "the then existing use" should be changed to "an existing
and proper use."
The last part of Section 2 (d) reading "unless so conducted
as to * * * adversely affect the then existing value of the land,"
would encourage litigation and unfounded claims against operators
of aircraft. It would not be difficult for land-owners to produce
witnesses who would testify that flights even at altitudes of a thou-
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sand feet or more adversely affected the value of particular land
flown over.
In dealing with alleged nuisances, courts generally have held
that diminution in the value of property is not alone sufficient to
warrant injunctive relief. (Aufderheide v. Polar Wave Ice & Fuel
Co., 319 Mo. 337, 4 S. W. (2d) 776, 786; Dallas Land & Loan Co.
v. Garrett, Tex. Civil Appeals, 276 S. W. 471, 474; Rouse & Smith
v. Martin & Flowers, 75 Ala. 510, 515.) In the latter case, the
Court said:
"The law is settled, on sound reasons, that the mere fact of the
diminution of the value of complainant's properly, or the increased risks

from hazard of fire, occasioned by a structure erected by a defendant
upon a lot adjoining the complainant's premises, without more, is unavailing as a ground of equitable relief.-2 Story's Eq. Jur. §925; Morris &
E. R. Co. v. Prudden, 20 N. J. Eq. 530; 1 High on Inj. §788; Wood on
Nuis. §511. This is one of the many risks and discomforts naturally incident to town or city life, which persons of prudence can not fail to

reasonably anticipate.-Ray v. Lynes, 10 Ala. 63."
Evidence of diminution in value of property may be considered
in determining whether a nuisance exists (Conway v. Gampel, 235
Mich. 511, 209 N. W. 562), but it should not be a sole test as to
the lawfulness of flight. Therefore, the concluding clause of Section 2 (d), making the lawfulness of flight dependent upon the
effect on land values, should be eliminated.
We have suggested the elimination of Sections 2 (a) and 2 (b)
and the revision of Section 2 (d) of the proposed Uniform Law
of Airflight. We appreciate, however, the desirability of legislation on this subject as an aid to the courts in determining correlative rights of operators of aircraft and landowners and to this end
we suggest that Section 2 be revised to read:
"2. Lawfulness of Flight. Flight of aircraft, including taking off
and landing at regularly established airports and landing places in this
State is lawful, unless so conducted as to involve a substantial risk of
harm to individuals or property on the land, or as to constitute an unreasonable interference with an existing and proper use and enjoyment-of
the land or structures on the land or space over the land."

B.

Unlawful Flight and Unlawful Acts During Flight, Section
3, Page 25, Lines 1 to 20.
"It shall be unlawful:
"(a) For any person to operate an aircraft either on or over land
in this state without the consent of the owner of such aircraft; or
"(b) For, any individual while under the influence of intoxicating

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
liquor or of any drug, to operate or attempt to operate any aircraft
either on or over the land of this state; or
"(c) For any person to carry on or over land in this state in an
aircraft, other than public aircraft, without a special permit from the
state (Aeronautical Commission), any explosive substance except such
as may be reasonably necessary for the operation of the aircraft itself; or
"(d) For any person other than a-peace officer or a member of the
military or naval forces of the United States or of this state, in the
performance of his duty, to discharge a gun, pistol or other weapon in or
from any aircraft on or over the land of this state."
Section 3 is important not only because of the subject matter,
but because of the penalty of fine and imprisonment imposed by
Section 4. Section 3 is therefore a criminal statute and will be
subject to strict construction.
The use of the word "consent" in Section 3 (a) may raise the
question of whether a person having an owner's consent to operate
an airplane on a particular trip, violates the statute if he flies to a
place not specifically authorized.
Section 3 (b) assumes that all drugs are bad. If there is necessarily danger in the operation of an airplane by a person who has
diabetes, the prohibition should be directed against the licensing of
such pilots instead of against the taking of insulin. As laymen, we
assume that a diabetic pilot is safer with insulin than without it.
This is a subject which relates to the qualifications of pilots and
should be dealt with by regulation rather than by statute (See Section 74B of Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7).
Section 3 (c) prohibiting the transportation of explosive substances without a special State permit makes only one exception,
namely, substances necessary for operation of the aircraft. The
Department of Commerce regulation on this subject (Section 74B
of Aeronautics Bulletin No. 7) provides:
"The transporting of any explosives other than that necessary for
signaling or fuel for such aircraft while in flight, or materials for industrial and agricultural spraying (dusting) is prohibited, except upon
special authority obtained from the Secretary of Commerce."
Further exceptions to the prohibition against transportation of
explosives should be made to cover flares carried to illuminate the
ground at night in case of emergency landings, ammunition carried
by crew members and other authorized persons, and explosives such
as motion picture films, which are mailable under regulations prescribed by the Postmaster General (See Sec. 588 of Postal Law
and Regulations, 1932).
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Section 3 (c) is ambiguous, in that it does not definitely state
against whom the prohibition is directed. If a passenger on an air
line carried shot-gun shells or other explosives in his suit-case without the knowledge of any employee of the air line, would the passenger or the air line, or both, be guilty of violation of the Act?
Special authority obtained from the Secretary of Commerce
under the above Section 74B for transportation of explosives on an
interstate trip would probably obviate the necessity of a State permit under Section 3 (c).
Section 3 (d) prohibits the discharge of a pistol while in flight,
.except by a "peace officer." Officials, such as marshals, constables,
policemen and sheriffs, would undoubtedly come within the meaning of the term, but a doubt might arise as to public or private
detectives who usually carry arms when prisoners in their custody
are being transported by air. What is more important, the term
"peace officer" probably would not include pilots. Scheduled air
lines, and especially those transporting United States mail, usually
require their pilots to carry revolvers. This practice is considered
advisable not only for the protection of the United States mail, but
also because of the necessity of being able to preserve order among
passengers while in flight. If a pilot is compelled to discharge a
revolver in self defense or to avoid a crash, he certainly should not
be subjected to a risk of fine and imprisonment for so doing.
VI.

THE UNIFORM AIR JURISDICTION ACT

A. Jurisdiction Over Contracts, Section 1, Page 27, Lines 1 to 5.
"1. All contractual and other legal relations entered into by any
persons in an aircraft while in flight in this state shall have the same
effect as if entered into on the land beneath."

The necessity for Section 1 is not apparent as courts would
undoubtedly apply the rule stated in the absence of. any statutory
provision.
B.

Jurisdiction Over Torts and Crimes, Section 2, Page 27,
Lines 1 to 6.
"2. All torts and crimes committed by or against an owner or
operator of an aircraft or by or against a passenger or other person or
on or by means of an aircraft while such aircraft is in flight in this state
shall be governed by the laws of this state."
This section also appears to be unnecessary.

It adds nothing

to existing law and might possibly create difficulties of interpreta-
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tion as to torts which are governed by the law of a State where an
act takes effect instead of where committed. (See Sec. 377 and
illustrations cited thereunder in the Restatement of the Law of
Conflict of Laws.)
C. Presumption as to Jurisdiction, Sec. 3, Page 27, Lines 1 to 13.
"3. (a) In the absence of proof to the contrary it shall be presumed that any act or transaction in the air, involved in any proceeding
in the courts of this state, was committed or occurred in the state from
which the aircraft last took off previous to such act or transaction.
(b) If it be established that at the time of the commission or
occurrence of the act or transaction, the aircraft Had passed the boundaries of the state from which it last took off, it shall be similarly presumed that the act or transaction was committed or occurred in the state
into which it next entered, and so on from state to state."

The speed of air transportation is such that great difficulty may
be encountered in proving venue of crimes in particular cases. In
criminal cases in State courts it will be necessary, in prosecutingcrimes committed on aircraft, to prove not only the State but in
some states also the county over which the airplane was passing
when the offense occurred, unless the necessity for such proof can
be obviated by a valid statutory provision.
The above quoted Section 3 deals with the problem Qf ascertaining the State over which an airplane is flying when a crime is
committed therein, and in some cases it may do more harm than
good. Section 3 assumes that crimes committed in aircraft will
always be discovered as soon as the airplane lands and ignores the
fact that there may be a succession of landings and take-offs between the commission of a crime and its discovery.
In State v. Buchanan, 130 N. C. 660, 41 S.E. 107, a passenger
on a train was robbed while traveling from Atlanta, Georgia, to
Hamlet, North Carolina. The train traversed Georgia, South Carolina and a part of North Carolina. The passenger was asleep during the trip and did not know where the theft occurred. The
defendant was indicated and tried for larceny in North Carolina
and filed a plea of not guilty. The Supreme Court of North Carolina applied the rule existing in that State, that if a criminal prosecution in the state is claimed to involve a crime committed in another state, the lack of jurisdiction must be proved as a defense
tinder a plea of not guilty (State v. Mitchell, 83 N. C. 674). The
court said at page 107:
"If the crime was originally committed in Georgia or South Carolina,
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it was not an offense against the laws of this state, and the courts here
have no jurisdiction of offenses against the laws of another state. While
the defendant was entitled to have this defense under the plea of not
guilty, it was still a matter of defense, and the burden was upon him
(State v. Mitchell, 83 N. C. 674) ; and, while this is so, he was entitled
to the benefit of any evidence introduced by the state proving or tending
to prove that the larceny, if committed at all, was not committed in
North Carolina."
In order to apply State v. Buchanan, supra, to aviation, assume that A and B are passengers on an airplane flying from
Savannah, Georgia, to Raleigh, North Carolina, making a landing
and take-off at Charleston, South Carolina, enroute. Somewhere
between Savannah and Raleigh, A robs B, but B does not discover
the robbery until the airplane reaches Raleigh. Assume further that
it is possible to prove by circumstantial evidence that A did rob B,
but that there is no proof to establish the State over which the robbery took place. In such an assumed case, conviction of the defendant in North Carolina would be possible under the rule of
State v. Buchanan if the above Section 3 were not in effect. However, if Section 3 were in effect, it would raise a presumption that
the crime occurred in either South Carolina or Georgia and the
defendant would escape punishment in North Carolina. If Section
3 were also in effect in South Carolina and Georgia, the statutory
presumption would not aid the authorities in either jurisdiction,
because there would be just as good reason to presume that the
crime occurred after take-off in one State as in the other. Section 3
(a) provides that there shall be a presumption that the crime was
committed in the state from which the aircraft last took off "previouT to such act or transaction," but this presumption would not
be of any help in a case where there is no proof to show whether
the crime took place after the take-off in Georgia or after the takeoff in South Carolina.
With the advent of sleeper airplanes, it is certainly possible
that crimes may be committed on airplanes making a succession of
landings and take-offs during over-night trips and will not be discovered until the airplane arrives at destination the next morning.
In such cases, Section 3, which provides that the unknown factorhe place of the commission of the crime-must be ascertained to
determine the particular take-off which shall fix jurisdiction, would
only create confusion and might prevent a conviction that would
be possible under existing law.
The proposed statutory presumption that a crime was com-,
mitted "in the State" from which an airplane last took off, will be
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of no assistance with respect to flights which do not take off from
any state, such as flights involved in the operation of United Air
Lines and Canadian Airways from Vancouver, Northwest Airlineg
from Winnipeg, Canadian-Colonial Airways and Boston-Maine Airways from Montreal and Pan American Airways from Honolulu,
Mexicala, Tampico and points in Europe, South America and the
West Indies. Nor would the statute be helpful if occasion should
arise to establish the place of an act during a trip by American
Airlines between Buffalo and Detroit, where practically the entire
flight is over the Dominion of Canada.
The establishment of the venue of a crime committed on an
airplane in a particular State, by legislative presumption does not
provide a solution, of the more difficult problem of establishing
venue in a particular county. There are 13 States* which have constitutional provisions that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to a jury trial in the county or district in which the
offense was committed. There are eleven States** in which there
are constitutional guaranties of a jury trial in the county in which
the offense is "alleged" to have been committed. In the remaining
States other constitutional provisions simply guaranteeing the right
to jury trial without specific reference to a jury of the county may
be construed to require a jury trial in the county where the offense
is committed (see People v. Brock, 149 Mich. 464, 112 N. W. 1116).
Difficulties with such constitutional provisions have been encountered in cases relating to crimes comritted on trains and other
conveyances, and many States have statutes designed to solve this
problem as to surface carriers. The validity of such statutes has
been upheld in some States and denied in others. The Iowa statute
on this subject refers specifically to crimes committed on aircraft.
Section 13453 of the 1935 Iowa Code provides:
"When an offense is committed within the jurisdiction of the state
on any railroad car while passing over any railroad, or any boat, raft,
or vessel navigating a river, lake or canal, or lying therein in the prosecution of her voyage, or in any kind of aircraft while in flight, the jurisdiction is in any county through which it passes in the course of its trip
or voyage, or in the county where the trip or voyage shall begin or
terminate."

The above Iowa statute (as it existed prior to an amendment to
include aircraft) was applied in Nash v. State, 2 G. Greene (Iowa
*

Alabama, Arkansas,

Florida, Indiana,

Louisiana, Minnesota,

Mississippi,

New Hampshire, Oklahoma, Oregon, Tennessee, Wisconsin and West Virginia.
** Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico,
Ohio, South Dakota, Utah and Wyoming.
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1849) 286, but the constitutionality of the statute was not discussed.
The Iowa Constitution (Art. I, Sec. 10) does not expressly require
trial by jury in a particular county, but does guarantee the right to
trial by jury.
In State v. Reese, 112 Wash. 507, 192 Pac. 934, a watch was
stolen from a passenger on an overnight railroad trip from Tacoma
to Spokane. Thereafter the defendant pawned the stolen watch in
Spokane and was apprehended and convicted of grand larceny in
Spokane County. A Washington statute provided that the route
traversed by railway trains should be criminal districts and that the
jurisdiction of all public offenses committed thereon should be in
any county through which the train might pass, or in which the trip
might begin or terminate. The Constitution of Washingfon guaranteed a trial by jury of the county in which "the offense is alleged
to have been committed." In holding the statute unconstitutional,
the Supreme Court of Washington said:
"Under this section of the Constitution, one accused of crime has a
right to be tried in the county in which the offense is alleged to have
been committed. It requires no argument to show that, the offense being
alleged in a particular county, the proof must show that it was committed in that county. Comparing the provisions of the statute with the
requirements of the Constitution, it appears that the statute goes beyond
the constitutional limitation. Under the statute the route traversed by
a railway train is made a criminal district, and an offender may be
prosecuted in any county in such district. Under the Constitution, he
can only be prosecuted in the county where the offense has been com-

mitted."
After the decision in Washington v. Reese, supra, the Constitution of Washington was amended to provide that routes traversed
by railway trains or public conveyances and boats shall be criminal
districts.
Similar statutes were held to be unconstitutional under less
definite constitutional provisions in State v. Anderson, 191 Mo. 134,
90 S.W. 95, and in People v. Brock, f49 Mich. 464,112 N. W. 1116.
In Watt v. The People, 126 Ill.
9, 18 N. E. 340, an express
messenger, traveling on the Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
from Chicago, Illinois, to Davenport, Iowa, was murdered. The
murder was committed between Joliet in Will County and Morris
in Grundy County, and it was impossible to determine in which
the murder was committed. The defendants were indicted and convicted in Grundy County. In upholding the conviction, the Supreme
Court relied upon a provision in the Illinois Criminal Code (Ill.
State Bar Stats. 1935, Chapter 38, Sec. 729), providing that if it
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is doubtful in which of several counties a homicide is committed,
the accused may be tried in either county. The court found it
unnecessary to rely upon a statute dealing specifically with crimes
committed on railroads. The court said at page 16:
"Undoubtedly the right to a trial by a jury of the county in which
the crime charged was committed is ordinarily a substantial and important legal right. It secures to the accused a trial among his neighbors
and acquaintances, and at a place.where, if innocent, he can most readily
make that fact to appear. Bnt it is difficult to see how that can be the
case where the offense is committed on a railway train, and the circumstances are such that it can not be definitely located in any one of
several counties through which the train passes. Those who are on the
train are for the time being completely segregated from the communities
through which they are rapidly passing, and there is ordinarily no circumstances which can make it more advantageous for a person accused
of such crime to be tried in one county than in another. The right in
such case to a trial in a particular county, if it exists at all, is at best a
technical right, having no substantial importance or value to the accused.
Whenever the locus in quo of the offense can be precisely identified,
under the provisions of the section of the statute first above quoted, the
trial should of course be had in the county where it was committed, but
when such is not the case a somewhat different rule must be applied or
the offender can not be tried at all. When it can not be determined in
which of two or more counties the criminal act was perpetrated, the
offender must, ex necessitate, be tried in a county which can not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt to be the actual zAsne of the crime.
If he can not be so tried the law is powerless to punish him. The evidence of his guilt may be ever so conclusive, but because of the impossibility of proving upon which side of an imaginary line the swiftly
moving train happened to be at the instant the homicidal blow was struck,
the murderer must be given complete practical immunity from all the
penal consequences of this heinous offense. No court should adopt a
construction of the law which would involve consequences of this character unless forced to do so by considerations which are insurmountable."

In Watt v. The People, supra, the Court also relied upon the
fact that the Illinois Constitution of 1848 guaranteed a jury trial of
the county "wherein the offense shall have been committed," whereas the Constitution of 1870 required a jury trial of the county "in
which the offense is alleged to have been committed."
The following provision appears in the Code of Criminal Procedure, Proposed Final Draft April 1, 1930, of the American Law
Institute:
"Section 249, Offenses in or against aircraft. Any person who commits an offense in or against any aircraft while it is in flight over this
state may be tried in this state. The trial in such case may be in any
county over which the aircraft passed in the course of such flight."
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The weight of authority appears to be against the constitutionality- of statutory provisions creating venues of criminal offenses
in any county through which a conveyance operates. However, the
reasoning in Watt v. People, supra, is persuasive, and the imperative necessity of such legislation with respect to aircraft might induce courts to uphold its validity. The greatest difficulty will exist
as to cases where it is impossible to furnish proof as to either the
state or county over which an airplane was passing at the time of
the commission of a crime. In such cases the courts would probably
be extremely reluctant to sustain a conviction obtained by invoking
one statutory presumption to ascertain the State ovier which a crime
was committed and a second statutory presumption to ascertain the
county over which a crime was committed.
Morrison v. California, 291 U. S. 82, suggests a possible solution of the difficulty. The defendants were convicted of conspiracy
to violate the California Alien Land Law, which prohibited the
occupation or use of land for agritultural purposes by an alien who
was neither a citizen nor eligible for naturalization, unless permitted by treaty. Section 9 (a) of the statute provided that in
cases where the State proved the use or occupation of land for agricultural purposes by the defendant, the burden of proving citizenship
or eligibility for citizenship should rest on the defendant. In discussing the question of whether the State could thus shift the burden of proof to the defendant, the Supreme Court said at page 88:
"The decisions are manifold that within limits of reason and fairness the burden of proof may be lifted from the state in criminal
prosecutions and cast on a defendant. The limits are in substance these,
that the state shall have proved enough to make it just for the defendant
to be required to repel what has been proved with excuse or explanation,
or at least that upon a balancing of convenience or of the opportunities
for knowledge the shifting of the burden will be found to be an aid to
the accuser without subjecting the accused to hardship or oppression.
Cf. Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 5, Secs. 2486, 2512, and cases cited."

In reversing the conviction on the ground that Section 9a did
not satisfy the requirements of the foregoing rule, the Supreme
Court said at page 90:
"Possession of agricultural land by one not shown to be ineligible
for citizenship is an act that carries with it not even a hint of criminality.
To prove such possession without more is to take hardly a step forward
in support of an indictment. No such probability of wrongdoing grows
out of the naked fact of use or occupation as to awaken a belief that'the
user or occupier is guilty if he fails to come forward with excuse or explanation. Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U. S. 178, 183, 184; Luria v.
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United States, 231 U. S. 9, 25; Casey v. United States, 276 U. S. 413, 418;
Mobile, J. K. & C. R. Co. v. Turnipseed, 219 U. S. 35, 42, 43; Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U. S. 219, 233, 238; Manley v. Georgia, 279 U. S. 1; People
v. Cannon, 139 N. Y. 32. 'The legislature may go a good way in raising
[a presumption] or in changing the burden of proof, but there are
limits.' McFarland v. American Sugar Co., 241 U. S. 79, 86. What is
proved must be so related to what is inferred in the case of a true presumption as to be at least a warning signal according to the teachings
of experience. 'It is not within the province of a legislature to declare
an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.' McFarland v.
American Sugar Co., supra; Bailey v. Alabama, supra; Manley v. Georgia,
supra. There are, indeed, 'presumptions that are not evidence in a
proper sense but simply regulations of the burden of proof.' Casey v.
United States, supra. Even so, the occasions that justify regulations of
the one order have a kinship, if nothing more, to those that justify the
others. For a transfer of the burden, experience must teach that the
evidence held to be inculpatory has at least a sinister significance (Yee
Hem v. United States, supra; Casey v. United States, supra), or, if
this at times be lacking, there must be in any event a manifest disparity
in convenience of proof and opportunity for knowledge, as, for instance,
where a general prohibition is applicable to every one who is unable to
bring himself within the range of an exception. Greenleaf, Evidence,
Vol. 1, Sec. 79. The list is not exhaustive. Other instances may have
arisen or may develop in the future where the balance of convenience
can be redressed without oppression to the defendant through the same
procedural expedient."
In its opinion in Morrison v. California,291 U. S. 82, the Court
referred to the fact that Section 9 (b) of the same California law
was before the Court in Morrison v. California, 288 U. S. 591,
where an appeal was dismissed for want of a substantial federal
question upon a statement as to jurisdiction. In its opinion in 291
U. S., the Court at page 87 explained the ground of its former

ruling:
"This court in Morrison v. California, 288 U. S. 591, passed upon a
controversy as to the validity of Section 9b of the California Land Law,
which, though akin to Section 9a, has important elements of difference.
This section (9b) provides in substance that, when it has been proved
that the defendant has been in the use or occupation of real property, and
when it has also been proved that he is a member of a race ineligible
for citizenship under the naturalization laws of the United States, the
defendant shall have the burden of proving citizenship as a defense.
We sustained that enactment when challenged as invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution. The state had given
evidence with reference to the defendant, the occupant of the land, that
by reason of his race he was ineligible to be made a citizen. With this
evidence present, we held that the burden was his to show that by reason
of his birth he was a citizen already, and thus to bring himself within
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a rule which has the effect of an exception. In the vast majority of
cases, he could do this without trouble if his claim of citizenship was
honest. The People, on the other hand, if forced to disprove his claim,
would be relatively helpless. In all likelihood his life history would be
known only to himself and at times to relatives or intimates unwilling to
speak against him."

Therefore, Section 9 (a) of the California law, providing that
a mere allegation of alienage and ineligibility to citizenship should
shift the burden of proof to the defendant, was held invalid, but
Section 9(b), providing that the burden of proof should shift only
after proof by the State that the defendant was a member of a race
ineligible for citizenship, was held valid.
We suggest the following as a statutory provision within the
rule of Morrison v. California:
"In any civil or criminal proceeding in this state relating to any
crime or tort committed in an aircraft operated over two or more
counties of this state or over this state and any other state, proof by
the state or the plaintiff that the defendant in such proceeding had the
means and opportunity to commit such crime or tort while said aircraft
was in flight over this state, shall be sufficient to establish the venue of
such'crime or tort in the county charged by the indictment, information
or other pleading by which such proceeding was instituted, unless the
defendant shall prove as a defense that said crime or fort was not committed while said aircraft was in flight over said county."

It is our opinion that such a statutory provision would be upheld under the Federal Constitution. We are further of the opinion
that it would probably be upheld against attacks based on State
constitutional provisions to the effect that the defendant in criminal
proceedings shall have the right to a jury trial in the county where
the offense was committed.
It may be suggested that such a statute would violate limitations on State jurisdiction, as stated in the Restatement of the Law
of Conflict of Laws at Sections 425, 427 and 428.
"425. Except as stated in Section 426 [jurisdiction to punish for an
act of a national], a state has no jurisdiction to make an act or event a
crime if the act is done or the event happens outside its territory.
427. No state will punish a violation of the criminal law of another
state.
428. The law of a state determines whether an act done or event
caused to happen within the state is a crime."

It is our opinion that the foregoing limitations as to State
jurisdiction would not prevent operation of the statuory provision
suggesed in cases where it should be given effect. In such cases
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there will be some proof of venue, plus a legislative presumption
and the absence of adequate proof to establish that the tort or crime
was committed elsewhere than in the county charged in the indictment. The statute might cause inconvenience and hardships to
defendants in particular cases, but the problem is one of balancing
conveniences and courts would probably apply the general rule that
in order to make its regulation effective a State may cause hardship
to perfectly innocent parties (Rupert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264;
Purity Extract Company v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192; Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U. S. 231).
There are a number of objections which can be made to the
statutory provision we have suggested. It is confined to crimes and
torts and is not as broad as proposed Section 3, which deals with
"any act or transaction in the air." Furthermore, the provision we
have suggested is limited to crimes or torts "committed in an aircraft," and in a criminal case this language might impose on the
prosecution the burden of proving that the crime was in fact committed in an aircraft. In cases or robbery occurring at some unknown point between point of departure and destination, it might
be impossible to establish whether a theft from a passenger occurred in the airplane or at a stop where the passenger temporarily
left the airplane.
The foregoing statutory provision, in so far as it relates to
counties, would not be necessary or appropriate in States which do
not require that the venue of crimes be laid in any particular county.
The greatest difficulty in establishing venue with respect to acts
committed on airplanes while in flight may be expected to occur
with respect to crimes such as robbery, which may not be discovered
until a substantial time after the event occurs. In cases of torts
and crimes involving violence, it usually will be possible either to
produce eye witnesses as to the occurrence of the event or other
testimony, such as the probable time at which death occurred, to
establish venue. This anticipated difficulty with respect to robbery
and similar crimes might be solved as to interstate trips by federal
legislation. Section 409 of Title 18 of the United States Code
provides in part:
"Whoever shall steal or shall unlawfully take by any fraudulent
device, scheme, or game, from any passenger car, sleeping car, or dining
car, or from any passenger or from the possession of any passenger
while on or in such passenger car, sleeping car, or dining car, when such
car is a part of a train moving from one State or Territory or the
District of Columbia, to another State or Territory or the District of
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Columbia or to a foreign country or from a foreign country to any State
or Territory or the District of Columbia, any money, baggage, goods or
chattels, or who shall buy, receive, or have in his possession any such
money, baggage, goods or chattels, knowing the same to have been stolen,
shall in each case be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both, and prosecutions therefor may be instituted in
any district wherein the crime shall have been committed or in which
the defendant may have taken or been in possession of the said money,
baggage, goods, or chattels."
Section 410 of Title 18 of the United States Code provides that

the above Section 409 shall not impair the jurisdiction of State
courts and that a conviction or acquital on the merits under the
laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution under Section

409.
In view of the fact that the greatest practical difficulties as to
venue are apt to be encountered on interstate trips, we suggest that
an amendment of the above federal statute to cover aircraft would
be desirable.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL M. GODEHN,
GERALD B. BROPHY,
FRANCIS D. BUTLER,
HAMILTON 0. HALE.

and

September 3, 1937.

APPENDIX
AN ACT
UNIFORM AVIATION LIABILITY ACT

Defining the liability of the owners and operators of aircraft for
injury or damage inflicted thereby to persons or property; and to make
uniform the law with reference thereto.
Be it enacted, etc.
§ 1. DEFINITIONS. Unless the context indicates a contrary intention,
when used in this act:
(a) "Aircraft" means any contrivance now known or hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in the air.
(b) "Land" means the surface of the earth, and includes both ground
and water.
(c) "Operator" means the individual (ordinarily the pilot) who is in
direct physical control of the movement of aircraft during or incidental to
flight.
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(d)
"Owner" means the person whose consent is necessary for the
operation of an aircraft. The person in whose name an aircraft is registered
with the Department of Commerce of the United States shall be prima facie
the owner thereof. Unless he is the person actually causing the aircraft to
be operated, the holder of the title shall not be deemed the owner during a
bona fide lease or bailment to another, nor shall a mortgagee, conditional
seller, trustee for creditors, or other person having a security title only, be
deemed the owner. A person shall not be deemed the owner if the aircraft
has been taken from his possession without his consent or acquiescence.
(e)
"Passenger" means any individual in, on or boarding an aircraft
for the purpose of riding therein or alighting from the aircraft following a
flight or attempted flight therein excluding, however, any individual operating
the aircraft as a pilot or serving as a member of the crew of the aircraft.
(f)
"Person" means any individual or any corporation or other association of individuals.
(g) "Personal representative" means executor, administrator, dependent,
guardian, or any other person entitled by statute to maintain an action for
another's injury or death, or entitled, either at common law or by statute, to
recover for damage to another's property.
(h)
"Public aircraft" means an aircraft owned or operated by the government of a foreign nation, of the United States, of the District of Columbia,
or any state, territory, or insular possession of the United States, while in
use for an essentially governmental purpose.
(i) Unless the context indicates a contrary intention, the singular shall
include the plural and the masculine gender shall include the feminine and
neuter genders.
§ 2. LIABILITY FOR INJURIES TO INDIVIDUALS AND PROPERTY ON THE LAND.
(a) For injuries within this state to individuals or property on the land, the
owner of any aircraft, except a public aircraft, shall be liable, regardless of
negligence, to those, or to the personal representatives of those, injured in
person or property, by the ascent or descent or attempt to ascend or flight or
other movement of an aircraft, or by the falling or dropping of any object
therefrom, unless the injury was caused by the wilful misconduct of the
party injured in person or property, as follows:
(1) For personal injury or death, to the extent of the actual damage,
but not exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000) for injury to or death of
any one individual, and not exceeding maximum amounts, varying according
to the horsepower of the aircraft, for injury to or death of any number of
individuals in any one accident, as follows:
Horsepower
Maximum Amount
200 or less ................................. $ 20,000
201 to 300 .................................
30,000
301 to 500 ................................. 50,000
501 to 900 ................................. 90,000
901 or m ore ...............................
100,000
(2)
For property damage, to the extent of the actual damage, but not
exceeding five dollars ($5.00) for each pound of the weight of the aircraft
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fully loaded, and not exceeding a maximum of one hundred thousand dolars ($100,000).
(3) For the purposes of this Section, the horsepower or weight fully
loaded of an aircraft as stated in the application for registration filed with
the Bureau of Air Commerce of the Government of the United States shall
be conclusive; and a photostatic copy, duly certified, of such application
shall be received in evidence in the courts of this state. In order to limit
his liability under this Section, the burden of proving the horsepower or the
weight fully loaded of an aircraft shall be upon the owner thereof.
(b) This Section shall not impose liability for injuries to or death of
passengers, or of employees of the owner of the aircraft, or for loss of or
damage to baggage, personal effects or goods on the aircraft at the time of or
immediately prior to the accident.
(c) Any person or his personal representative may elect, notwithstanding the provisions of this Section, to seek to recover from the owner of an
aircraft for negligence resulting in injury to individuals or property on the
land, but in any procceding to impose liability otherwise than under this
Section such person or his personal representative must prove affirmatively
the cause of the accident and that it was caused by the negligence of the
owner or of his agent.
§ 3.

LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO OR DEATH OF PASSENGERS-AIRCRAFT CARRY-

ING PASSENGERS FOR COMPENSATION.

(a)

Except as provided in Subsection

(b) of this Section, the owner of aircraft carrying passengers for compensation shall be liable, regardless of negligence, in the following amounts,
for injury within this state to a passenger or death resulting therefrom, from
any cause, unless the injury or death shall be shown to have been caused by
the wilfull misconduct of the passenger who or whose personal representative
is making claim; and a passenger or his personal representative shall be
limited in recovery, to the following amounts:
For death, permanent total disability, the total and permanent loss of the
sight of both eyes, or permanent loss of the use of both hands or permanent
loss of the use of both feet, or permanent loss of the use of one hand and
one foot, or permanent loss of the use of one hand and thetotal and permanent loss of the sight of one eye, or permanent loss of the use of one foot
and the total and permanent loss of the sight of one eye, ten thousand dollars ($10,000) ;
For permanent loss of the use of one hand, five thousand dollars ($5,000)
For permanent loss of the use of one foot, five thousand dollars ($5,000)
For the total and permanent loss of the sight of one eye, three thousand
dollars ($3,000) ;
For temporary total disability or permanent or temporary partial disability, or disfigurement or any other injury except those occasioned by the
loss of members or sight as previously specified, the injured party's actual
loss not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).
(b) Any owner of an aircraft carrying passengers for compensation
through or within this state may elect to establish a higher schedule of liabilities for injury or death which may vary according to the rate of compensation paid, and in such event the owner shall be liable, regardless of
negligence, in the amounts stipulated in such schedule according to the
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higher rate paid; but any agreement to lessen the liabilities imposed by this
Section shall be void as applied to injuries within this state or death resulting
therefrom.
(c) Any owner of an aircraft who has established a higher schedule of
liabilities as provided in the preceding subsection, shall keep a record of the
name and address of every passenger who pays a rate imposing liabilities
exceeding those specified in this Section, and shall furnish to every such
passenger written or printed evidence of the payment of such rate. Such
record shall be open to public inspection and the original or a photostatic
copy thereof shall be received in evidence in any action brought in this state
to recover under this Section.
§ 4.

NOT
The owner of aircraft not carrying passengers for compensation shall be liable for injury within this state
to a passenger or death resulting therefrom, from any cause incident to theoperation of aircraft, if such injury or death was caused by the negligence
of the owner or his agent, to the extent, if any, to which the owner of an
automobile is liable for injury within this state to A passenger not for compensation or death resulting therefrom.
LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO OR DEATH OF PASSENGERS-AIRCRAFT

CARRYING PASSENGERS

FOR COMPENSATION.

§ 5. LIABILITY FOR BAGGAGE, PERSONAL EFFECTS AND GOODS. (a) Before
the commencement of flight, the owner of aircraft carrying passengers or
goods for compensation, shall provide the passenger or the shipper of goods
with a blank upon which the passenger or shipper of goods shall specify in
writing the actual value of the passenger's baggage and the clothing and
other effects on his person, or the shipper's goods, and the passenger or
shipper shall not thereafter be permitted to claim that the baggage, personal
effects or goods were of a higher value.
(b) The owner of the aircraft may refuse to carry any passenger unless
the passenger specifies in writing on the form supplied to him for the purpose, the actual value of his baggage and of the clothing and other effects
on his person; and the owner of the aircraft may refuse to carry goods unless
the shipper similarly specifies the actual value thereof.
(c) Upon the failure of the owner to obtain from the passenger or
shipper a specification in writing of the value of the baggage, personal effects
or goods, there shall be no limitation upon the right of the passenger or
shipper to prove the actual value of the baggage, personal effects or goods.
(d) The owner of aircraft may establish and collect rates varying
according to the value of baggage, personal effects or goods, as specified in
writing by the passenger or shipper, the minimum rate being based upon
baggage, personal effects or goods of the value of one hundred dollars ($100).
(e) For loss of or damage to baggage, personal effects or goods, the
owner of aircraft shall be liable, regardless of negligence, in the amount of
the loss actually proved by the person entitled to collect damages, but not
exceeding the value specified.
(f) For delay in the delivery of baggage or goods, the owner of aircraft shall be liable for negligence, to the person entitled to collect damages,
to the extent of the actual loss, not exceeding the value specified.
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§ 6. COLLISION OF AIRCRAFT. (a) Except as otherwise in this Section
provided, the liability of the owner or the operator of one aircraft to the
owner, operator or passenger of another aircraft or his personal representative, for damage, injury or death caused by collision within this state on land or
in the air, or to the owner or shipper of goods on another aircraft, damaged
or destroyed by such collision, shall be determined by the rules of law
applicable to collisions on land.
(b) If a collision within this state is due to negligence of two or more
aircraft involved therein, the liability of the owner of each aircraft for damages caused to another aircraft, or to goods on another aircraft, or to individuals and property on the land, shall be in proportion to the degree of
negligence shown; but if such proportion cannot be established, or if the
degrees of negligence appear to be equal, the liability shall be shared equally.
(c) The owner of each aircraft carrying passengers for compensation
involved in a collision within this state, shall be liable for injuries to or death
of his own passengers in accordance with the provisions of this act relating
to liability to passengers, but such owner may proceed against the owner of
any other aircraft involved in the collision, for negligence, to recover the
amounts paid to his passengers. His recovery in such case shall be in proportion to the degree of negligence shown, as in the preceding subsection.
(d) In a suit by such owner's passenger or his personal representative
against the owner or operator of another aircraft to recover damages for
personal injury or death, it shall be necessary for the plaintiff to prove
negligence; negligence shall not be presumed from the happening of the
accident; and in the event of a recovery, the defendant shall be credited on
account of the judgment against him with the amount, if any, paid or payable under the provisions of this act to the passenger or his personal representative by the owner of the passenger's aircraft.
(e) This Section shall not require any plaintiff to proceed against the
owners of colliding aircraft jointly, but if he proceeds against the owner of
only one aircraft such owner may bring an action for contribution, in accordance with the provisions of this Section, against any or all of the other
aircraft involved in the collision.
§ 7. ASSUMPTION OF LIABILITY. No owner shall operate or permit to be
operated, an aircraft, except a public aircraft, over land in this state unless
such owner assumes the liabilities imposed by this act; and assumption on the
part of the owner of such liabilities shall be conclusively presumed from the
fact of flight over the land of this state.
§ 8. SERVICE OF PROCESS ON NON-RESIDENTS Every non-resident owner
or operator of an aircraft is conclusively presumed by the fact of flight over
land in this state to have constituted the [Secretary of State] his agent for
the service of process in any action brought against him by any person to
recover for injury, death or damage resulting from such flight within this
state. But such service shall not be complete until the plaintiff shall have
filed with the [Secretary of State] an affidavit that he has mailed to the
registered owner of the aircraft at the address stated in the owner's registration a notice, of which a copy shall be attached, that suit has been instituted
and that process is being served upon the [Secretary of State].
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§ 9. PROCEDURE FOR ENFORCING LIABILITY REGARDLESS Or NEGLIGENCE FOR
INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY ON THE LAND.
(a) The liability regardless of negligence

imposed by this act for injuries to individuals and

property on the land shall be enforceable only in an action instituted in the
court, within the time, and in the manner, hereinafter in this Section specified.
(b) Unless all claims have been sooner settled, within sixty (60) days
after the happening of any accident resulting in injury within this state to
an individual or property on the land, the owner of the aircraft involved
in such accident shall file in the court of [common pleas] of the [county] in
which the accident happened, a statement setting forth the time and place of
the accident, the name of his insurer, and the names and addresses, as far as
he has been able to ascertain them, of the persons injured in person or in
property, excluding passengers and employees of the owner on the aircraft
at the time of the accident. A copy of the owner's insurance policy shall be
attached to such statement.
(c) If the owner fails to file the statement as required by the preceding
Subsection, any person injured in person or property on the land, as the
result of such accident, may file such statement, but he shall not be required
to attach thereto a copy of the owner's insurance policy.

(d) Upon the filing of the statement the court shall issue its summons
in the names of the persons injured in person or in property or their personal representatives, as plaintiffs, and the owner and his insurer, as defendants, returnable as usual.
(e) The summons shall be served by the [sheriff] upon all plaintiffs
and defendants, but inability to obtain service upon the owner's insurer or any
other party shall not prevent the case from proceeding.
(f) Contemporaneously with the issuance of the summons, the court
shall direct the publication by the [clerk] of an advertisement, notifying all
persons, except passengers and employees of the owner, having claims against
the owner for injuries to individuals or property on the land, arising out of
the accident involved in the case, within forty-five (45)

days to intervene

as parties plaintiff.
(g)

Not later than sixty (60)

days after the first publication of such

advertisement, every party plaintiff shall file with the court his statement of
damage, and not later than seventy-five (75) days after such first publication the defendants may file answers. Thereafter the practice and procedure shall, except as herein otherwise provided, be the same as in an
action for damages for negligence.
(h) Any party plaintiff may within the time allowed by this Section
for filing his statement of damage, but not afterwards, give notice in such
statement that he elects not to participate in any recovery in the action but
to seek to recover for negligence in another action. Such party shall thereafter be precluded from any recovery in the action brought hereunder, but
the court shall nevertheless proceed to assess the amount of damages which
such party sustained.
(i) If the aggregate of all verdicts rendered against the owner, and of
damages assessed by the court under the preceding Subsection, exceeds the
aggregate of the owner's liability regardless of negligence, as limited by this
act, the court shall reduce the verdicts and assessments of damage pro rata,
to an aggregate amount equal to the owner's maximum liability.
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(j) The owner or his insurer shall pay all costs of any action brought
hereunder, -exclusive of plaintiff's attorney's fees.
(k) Judgment may be entered as in other cases, on verdicts rendered
in an action under this Section, and any party may appeal to the [Supreme]
Court within the time allowed for appeals in other civil cases.
(1) Satisfaction by or on behalf of the owner, of the judgments in
such proceeding shall discharge him in full from all claims for the liability

regardless of negligence imposed by this act, for injuries to individuals and
property on the land arising out of such accident.
§ 10. INSURANCE COMPULSORY IN CERTAIN CASES. (a) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or to cause to permit to be operated an
aircraft, except a public aircraft, either on or over the land of this state,
unless the owner of such aircraft carries insurance against the liability imposed by this act regardless of negligence for injuries to individuals or
property on the land.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to operate or cause or permit
to be operated an aircraft carrying passengers for compensation either on or
over the land of this state, unless the owner of such aircraft carries insurance against the liability imposed by this act regardless of negligence for
injuries to or death of passengers.
(c)
To comply with the requirements of this Section, a person must
carry insurance written by an insurance company authorized to transact
business in this state or in the state or country in which the owner of the
aircraft is domiciled or in which his principal place of business is located.
(d)
Every person required by this Section to carry insurance, shall
carry in the aircraft which is being operated on or over the land of this state,
a certificate issued by the duly authorized agent of his insurance carrier, evidencing valid insurance coverage as required by this Section.
(e)
Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Section shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable
by a fine of not more than ive thousand dollars ($5,000) or by imprisonment
for not more than one (1) year or both, in the discretion of the court.
§ 11. DISTRIBUTION OF AMOUNTS RECOVERED FOR DEATH. The distribution of amounts recovered by personal representatives tinder the provisions
of this act, for death, shall be distributed as provided in the act approved the
I
, one thousand
day of
[the act apentitled "
plicable to recovery for death by wrongful act].
If any provision of this act or the applica§ 12. CONSTITUTIONALITY.
tion thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity
shall not affect provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this act are declared to be severable.
§ 13. UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION. This act shall be so interpreted
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
of those states which enact it.
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§ 14. SHORT TITLE.
Liability Act."

This act may be cited as the "Uniform Aviation

§ 15. REPEAL. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
§ 16.

EFFECTIVE DATE.

This act shall take effect [ ......

Alternate Section 3, for Use in States in Which the Foregoing Section 3 Would be Unconstitutional Because of a Prohibition Against
Legislation Limiting the Amount of Recovery for Death.
ING

§ 3. LIABILITY FOR INJURY TO OR DEATH OF PASSENGERS-ARCRrFT CARRYPASSENGERS FOR COMPENSATION.
(a) The owner of aircraft carrying

passengers for compensation may elect to be liable in the following
regardess of negligence, for injury within this state to a passenger
resulting therefrom, from any cause unless the injury or death shall
to have been caused by the willful negligence of the passenger who
personal representative is making claim:

amounts,
or death
be shown
or whose

For death, permanent total disability, the total and permanent loss
of the sight of both eyes, or permanent loss of the use of both hands,
or permanent loss of the use of both feet, or permanent loss of the use
of one hand and one foot, or permanent loss of the use of one hand and
the total and permanent loss of the sight of one eye, or permanent loss
of the use of one foot and the total and permanent loss of the sight of
one eye, ten thousand dollars ($10,000) ;
For permanent loss of the use of one hand, five thousand dollars
($5,000) ;
For permanent loss of the use of one foot, five thousand -dollars
($5,000) ;
For the total and permanent loss of the sight of one eye, three thousand dollars ($3,000) ;
For temporary total disability or permanent or temporary partial
disability, or disfigurement or any other injury except those occasioned
by the loss of members or sight as previously specified, the injured
party's actual loss not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000).
(b) Unless the owner of an aircraft carrying passengers for compensation, notifies a passenger by a separate writing delivered to and receipted
for by the passenger prior to the commencement of flight, whether flight
commences within or outside of this state, that he rejects liability as here.tofore specified, such owner shall be conclusively presumed to have accepted
such liability for injury to the passenger within this state or death resulting
therefrom.
(c) Any owner of an aircraft who carries passengers for compensation
through or within this state may elect to establish a higher schedule of
liabilities for injury or death which may vary according to the rate of fare
paid; but any agreement to lessen the liabilities specified in Subsection (a)
of this Section shall be void as applied to injuries within this state or death
resulting therefrom.
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(d)' Any owner of an aircraft carrying passengers for compensation,
who has established a higher schedule of liabilities under the preceding Subsection, shall keep a record of the name and address of every passenger
who within this state pays a rate imposing liabilities exceeding those specified
in this Section, and shall furnish to every such passenger written or printed
evidence of the payment of such rate. Such record shall be open to public
inspection and the original or a photostatic copy thereof shall be received
in evidence in any action brought to recover under this Section.
(e) Any passenger of an aircraft carrying passengers for compensation may elect in lieu of his right of recovery at common law to accept
for injury within this state, and to bind his personal representative to accept
in case of his death resulting from such injury, the amounts heretofore in
this Section specified, or the amounts provided in his contract of passage,
not, however, less than those heretofore in this Section specified.
Every passenger of an aircraft carrying passengers for compensa(f)
tion shall, unless he rejects the provisions of this Section by a writing delivered to and receipted for by the owner, prior to the commencement of
flight, whether flight commences within or outside of this state, be conclusively presumed to have accepted for himself and his personal representative, the schedule of liabilities heretofore in this Section specified or such
higher schedule as may be provided by his contract of passage, for injury
within this state or death resulting therefrom.
If any owner shall reject in the manner provided by this Section,
(g)
the schedule of liabilities heretofore in this Section specified, he shall be
liable for injury to or death of a passenger without regard to the limitations
contained in this act; and in such case negligence shall be presumed from
the mere happening of the accident and the burden of proof shall rest upon
the owner to show the absence of negligence.
(h)
If any passenger shall reject in the manner provided in this Section,
the schedule of liabilities heretofore in this Section specified, he or his
personal representative may recover in an action of law for injury or death
without regard to the limitations contained in this act; but in every such
case it shall be necessary for the passenger or his personal representative,
to prove negligence on the part of the owner; and there shall be no presumption of negligence arising from the happening of the accident.

AN ACT
UNIFORM LAW OF AIRFLIGHT
Regulating Flight by Aircraft and to Make Uniform the Law with
Reference Thereto.
Be it enacted, etc.
§ 1. DEFINITIONS. Unless the context indicates a contrary intention, when
used in this act: (a) "Aircraft" means any contrivance now known or
hereafter invented, used, or designed for navigation of or flight in the air.
(b) "Land" means the surface of the earth, and includes both ground
and water.
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(c) "Person" means any individual or any corporation or other association of individuals.
(d)
"Public aircraft" means an aircraft owned or operated by the
government of a foreign nation, of the United States, of the District of
Columbia, or of any state, territory, or insular possession of the United
States, while in use for an essentially governmental purpose.
(e)
Unless the context indicates a contrary intention, the singular shall
include the plural and the masculine gender shall include the feminine and
neuter genders.
§ 2. LAWFULNESS OF FLIGHT. Flight of aircraft in this state is lawful:
(a) If in compliance with the laws of this state regulating aeronautics
and, as far as applicable, with such laws of the United States; and
(b)
If at a height permitted by the rules, regulations or orders adopted
and promulgated by the state (Aeronautical Commission], and the applicable
rules of the Department of Commerce of the United States; and
(c) Unless so conducted as to involve a substantial risk of harm to
individuals or property on the land; or
(d) Unless so conducted as to constitute a substantial interference
with the then existing use and enjoyment of the land or structures on the
land or space over the land or adversely affect the then existing value of the
land and structures thereon.
§ 3. UNLAWFUL FLIGHT AND UNLAWFUL AcTs DURING FLIGHT. It shall
be unlawful:
(a) For any person to operate an aircraft either on or over land in
this state without the consent of the owner of such aircraft; or
(b)
For any individual while under the influence of intoxicating liquor
or of any drug, to operate or attempt to operate any aircraft either on or
over the land of this state; or
(c)
For any person to carry on or over land in this state in any aircraft, other than public aircraft, without a special permit from the state
[Aeronautical Commission], any explosive substance except such as may be
reasonably necessary for the operation of the aircraft itself; or
(d)
For any person other than a peace officer or a member of the
military or naval forces of the United States or of this state, in the performance of his duty, to discharge a gun, pistol or other weapon in or from any
aircraft on or over the land of this state.
§ 4. PENALTIES. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions
of Section 3 of this act shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punishable by a fine of not more than five thousand
dollars ($5,000) or by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year or
both, in the discretion of the court.
§ 5. CONSTITUTIONALITY. If any provision of this act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of
this act are declared to be severable.

§ 6.

UNIFORMITY

OF INTERPRETATION.

This act shall be so interpreted
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and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
of those states which enact it.
§ 7. SHORT TITLE.
Airflight."

This act may be cited as the "Uniform Law of

§ 8. REPEAL. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed.

§ 9.

This act shall take effect [

EFFECTIVE DATE.

.

AN ACT
UNIFORM AIR JURISDICTION ACT
Relating to Jurisdiction Over Acts and Transactions in the Air.
Be it enacted, etc.
All contractual and other legal
§ 1. JURISDICTION OVER CONTRACTS.
relations entered into by any persons in an aircraft while in flight in this
state shall have the same effect as if entered into on the land beneath.
§2. JURISDICTION OVER TORTS AND CRIMES. All torts and
mitted by or against an owner or operator of an aircraft or by
passenger or other person or on or by means of an aircraft while
is in flight in this state shall be governed by the laws of this
§ 3.

PRESUMPTION AS TO JURISDICTION.

(a)

crimes comor against a
such aircraft
state.

In the absence of proof to

the contrary it shall be presumed that any act or transaction in the air,
involved in any proceeding in the courts of this state, was committed or
occurred in the state from which the aircraft last took off previous to such
act or transaction.
(b)
If it be established that at the time of the commission or occurrence
of the act or transaction, the aircraft had passed the boundaries of the state
from which it last took off, it shall be similarly presumed that the act or
transaction was committed or occurred in the state into which it next
entered, and so on from state to state.
This act shall be so interpreted
§ 4. UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION.
and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law
of those states which enact it.
§ 5. CONSTITUTIONALITY. If any provision of this act or the application
thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall
not affect provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions
of this act are declared to be severable.
§ 6. SHORT TITLE.
diction Act."

This act may be cited as the "Uniform Air Juris-

§ 7. REPEAL. All acts or parts of acts which are inconsistent with the
provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
§ 8.

EFFECTIVE DATE.

This act shall take effect [

.

.

.

